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Essay
'An Accident and a Dream:'
Problems with the Latest Attack on the
Civil Justice System*
Daniel J. Capra**
Introduction
Law professors receive scores of publications during the
year. Most pass by unread, some unnoticed. I hate to admit it,
but it takes a lot to capture my attention these days. So in
terms of attention-getting appeal, the publication 'An Accident
and a Dream:' How the Lawsuit Lottery Is Distorting Justice,
and Costing New Yorkers Billions of Dollars Every Year ('An Ac-
cident and a Dream')' was quite a success. 'An Accident and a
Dream'2 was written by the Public Policy Institute ("PPI"), an
affiliate of the Business Council of New York State, Inc.3 The
goal of the publication is to persuade the public, lawmakers,
* An earlier version of this essay was published by the New York State Bar
Association. See Daniel Capra, Capra Report: A Rising Tide of Torts?, N.Y. ST.
B.J., April, 1999, at 40.
** Philip Reed Professor of Civil Justice Reform, Fordham University School
of Law.
1. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, 'AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM:' How THE LAWSUIT
LOTTERY Is DISTORTING JUSTICE, AND COSTING NEW YORKERS BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
EVERY YEAR (1998) [hereinafter 'AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM].
2. The title 'AN ACCIDENT AND A DREA' derives from PPI's quotation from the
license plate frame of a personal injury lawyer. The license plate frame states
"ALL YOU NEED IS AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM." Id. at 2.
3. The New York Times reports that the Public Policy Institute is "a New York
business group pushing for lawsuit limits in New York." William Glaberson, The
$2.9 Million Cup of Coffee: When the Verdict Is Just a Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
1999, § 4, at 1.
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and people like me to support the cause of tort reform in New
York.
The publication is certainly timely because the cause of tort
reform is being considered in New York once again. For exam-
ple, New York Senate Bill 2277 would, among other things, im-
pose substantial limits on joint and several liability; cap non-
economic damages at $250,000; limit contingent fees; and adopt
a ten year Statute of Repose.4 A similar bill in the New York
State Assembly, 1999 New York Assembly Bill No. 7545, would
cap non-economic damages at $250,000; provide a claim struc-
ture for neurologically damaged infants; impose limitations on
municipal liability for injuries occurring at public recreation fa-
cilities; repudiate joint and several liability for non-economic
losses; adopt a ten year Statute of Repose for all products; pro-
tect sellers from liability for manufacturing defects; and impose
a schedule limiting contingent fees in malpractice actions.5
When I first read through 'An Accident and a Dream' I
thought it made a very compelling argument; it made me want
to join the forces of tort reform. In a nutshell, the report states
that tort lawsuits have become a "lottery" engineered by plain-
tiffs' lawyers greedy for a contingent fee;6 that New Yorkers are
paying $14.3 billion a year to support the "lawsuit industry,"
amounting to a "tort tax" of almost $800 imposed on every per-
son in the State;7 that lawyers pollute the system with advertis-
ing;8 that lawyers bring frivolous lawsuits and reap outrageous
jury verdicts;9 that damages are awarded not because defend-
ants are at fault, but because institutional defendants are deep
pockets; 10 and that the "runaway lawsuit industry" limits the
development of new products, and prices New York companies
out of the international market."
I am totally against paying a tort tax for frivolous lawsuits
resulting in windfall recoveries for undeserving lawyers, at the
expense of our competitiveness abroad to boot. If tort reform
4. See S. 2277, 222nd Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
5. See A. 7545, 222nd Assembly (N.Y. 1999).
6. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 2-4.
7. See id. at 1.
8. See id. at 2.
9. See id. at 2-4.
10. See id. at 3-6.
11. See id. at 2-3.
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would prohibit these bad things, then I am all for tort reform.
Instead of jumping on the tort reform bandwagon right away, I
decided to investigate the foundations and premises of 'An Acci-
dent and a Dream.' This essay is my report on the PPI report.12
I find two fundamental flaws with 'An Accident and a Dream.'
First, its factual premises are unsupported by reliable data, and
in fact most reliable data is completely contrary to the assump-
tions in the report. Second, even assuming that the tort system
has problems, the solution of "tort reform" will not solve those
problems; "tort reform" will simply shift the costs of injury re-
covery to some other, undoubtedly less efficient, mechanism.
This essay's critique of PPI's methodology and conclusions
hopefully has some resonance beyond a single "tort reform" re-
port. PPI's attack on the civil justice system is typical of recent
attacks by the business and insurance community in response
to the so-called "litigation explosion."13 These attacks basically
make the following alarmist assertions: that the tort system is
"out of control;" that people "sue at the drop of a hat" that plain-
tiffs' lawyers, looking only to make money, bring frivolous
claims and obtain outrageous, unjustified recoveries;' 4 that ju-
ries favor plaintiffs and are biased against businesses; that the
litigation explosion destroys our business competitiveness, in-
hibits innovation and research, and prevents businesses and
municipalities from engaging in socially worthwhile activities;
and that most of this outrageous cost is funneled to the coffers
12. Joanne Doroshow has authored a cogent and compelling response to PPI's
assertions. See JOANNE DOROSHOW, AN ACCIDENT AND A NIGHTMARE: A REBUTTAL
TO AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM (1998) [hereinaiter AN ACCIDENT AND A NIGHTMARE].
13. See Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of
Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 269, 284-85 (1989), noting the millions of dollars of advertisements
sponsored by the Insurance Information Institute and others which trumpet the
liability crisis. Daniels concludes that the advertising blitz has been "symbolically
manipulative." Id. at 285. For other overheated statements about the tort system,
see DAN QUAYLE, STANDING FIRM: A VICE PRESIDENTIAL MEMOIR 283 (1994) (stating
that Americans are "crazily litigious"); Aetna Advertisement, WALL ST. J., April 8,
1986, at § 9 (asserting that the legal system is "berserk").
14. See, e.g., Theodore Olson, Was Justice Served?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995,
at A14 (asserting that the civil justice system is "demented" and that financial
"bonanzas" are awarded to "persons who pour coffee on themselves or ricochet golf
balls into their own foreheads.").
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of well-heeled and politically connected plaintiffs' lawyers,
rather than to the injured themselves. 15
To state these assertions is basically to refute them on the
basis of commonly held experience. For example, our economy
does not appear to be at a competitive disadvantage; new prod-
ucts, particularly in the pharmaceutical field, are being re-
leased all the time; plaintiffs' lawyers are neither the most
numerous nor the most affluent members of the legal profession
and while the civil court system is burdened, most of the litiga-
tion we hear about is in the areas of criminal law, divorce, and
high profile commercial litigation (such as U.S. v. Microsoft). 6
So how does PPI get to conclusions that seem so far from
commonly held experience? The PPI report is based on several
sources of information, all of them highly questionable. PPI re-
lies on anecdotal evidence of a few selected litigation horror sto-
ries, in which plaintiffs allegedly received outrageous monetary
recoveries that they did not deserve. It goes without saying,
however, that civil justice reforms cannot be based on a few ex-
traordinary case results. More importantly, the reports of these
individual instances by PPI are themselves inaccurate. PPI, as
will be shown below, has chosen to tell only half the story of the
few stories it chooses to tell.
PPI also relies on statistics to show the cost of the tort sys-
tem, the increases in litigation, and the plethora of lawyers.
These statistics, however, suffer from several fatal flaws. First,
the factual foundations are often culled from biased sources.
Second, the statistics are often misleading because they fail to
account for important confounding factors and alternative ex-
planations. Third, PPI lays the costs of the system solely at the
feet of plaintiffs' lawyers and frivolous litigants, when in fact
much of the unnecessary cost in the system results from corpo-
rate wrongdoing, causing injury, and "hardball" litigation tac-
tics of insurance companies that deny legitimate claims.
Fourth, the quasi-statistical analysis about the costs of the tort
system fails to mention that the system provides the essential
15. See id. See also Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Leg-
ends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 718 (1998) [hereinafter Ga-
lanter, An Oil Strike in Hell], for a discussion and refutation of some of the
common refrains of the tort reform movement.
16. 163 F.3d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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benefits of victim compensation and product safety. Any focus
on costs without consideration of countervailing benefits is com-
pletely irresponsible.
Such irresponsible argument, clothed in numbers and fac-
toids, should not go unrebutted, especially when it is designed
to spur "tort reform." Part I of this Essay addresses the major
"factual" assertions set forth in the PPI report, and shows how
each of them is either unsubstantiated by the real facts, or mis-
leading and incomplete. Part II addresses some of the major
suggestions for reform espoused by PPI, and shows how these
suggestions are both unfair and ineffective.
Part I. Rebuttal of PPI Factual Contentions
1. The "Tort Tax"
Assertion:
PPI asserts that there is a "tort tax" of $14.3 billion per
year in New York, meaning that each person in New York pays
$787 per year to fund the system of tort recovery. 17
Analysis:
The most fundamental problem with the "tort tax" asser-
tion is that it intimates a saving if tort recoveries are reduced.
This is a fallacy because if people are injured, there must be
some system in place to compensate their losses. The tort sys-
tem that we currently have is one alternative, and there are
some others, such as a nationwide system of self-insurance, and
a system of social insurance such as is found in some countries.
Each of these alternatives has substantial costs because inju-
ries cannot be compensated for free. Thus, to pitch the "tort
tax" as if there is some cost-free alternative to compensating
injured victims is misleading and irresponsible. Professor Mark
Hager has noted that the "tort tax" proponents
write as if compensation payments present a "cost" to society
which would be diminished if we avoided making such payments.
To the contrary, the "costs" would still be there in the form of suf-
fered injuries. Compensation payments themselves do not create
additional costs. Rather, they distribute existing costs, the costs
17. See PU3LIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 22-25.
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of injuries, over a wider number of people, so that the injured ex-
perience less of the cost and the rest of us, through higher prices,
experience more.18
Professor Marc Galanter also notes the one-sided nature of
"tort tax" arguments:
The costs attributable to present institutional arrangements are
made to loom menacingly large by ignoring the costs of alterna-
tive arrangements for obtaining equivalent benefits. For exam-
ple, if we were to forego the tort system's contribution to accident
prevention, presumably people and businesses would make other
expenditures to prevent and minimize injury. The savings from
completely abolishing the tort system would not be all the billions
that flow through it - nor even all the billions spent on it - but
only that increment beyond what would be spent on the alterna-
tive means of protection. Therefore, a genuine assessment of the
legal system would have to consider not only its costs, but both
the benefits it produces and the cost of producing such benefits by
alternative means. 19
Thus, the fallacy of the "tort tax" argument is that it em-
phasizes the gross cost of the system, while making no attempt
to figure out the net cost.20 There is a negative inference that
can be derived from the business community's failure to make
an attempt to assess the net cost of the system; business inter-
ests might be unhappy to find that the system is less costly than
the alternatives. If that is so, it is much better and more lucra-
tive for businesses to move to limit tort recovery than it is to
determine whether the current system is actually doing a good
job.
The tort tax assertion might have some power if PPI could
break out some arguably unnecessary costs of the tort system.
For example, if the costs of the system were being increased by
rampant frivolous litigation, this would be a reason to think
about change. Yet PPI makes no attempt to prove that even an
infinitesimal amount of the "tort tax" is caused by unnecessary
or frivolous litigation.
18. Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to
Huber, 42 STAN. L. REV. 539, 546 (1990).
19. Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Jus-
tice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633, 681 n.80 (1984) (citing Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and
Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (1990)).
20. See generally PUBLIC POLICY INsTITUTE, supra note 1.
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It is probably wise for PPI to avoid a breakout of justified
and frivolous litigation costs. The costs of frivolous litigation
are undoubtedly minimal, because the current system heavily
discourages frivolous claims. A lawyer who brings a frivolous
claim risks substantial sanctions. 21 Moreover, most lawyers for
victims of personal injury operate by contingent fees, because
their clients are ordinarily unable to front the substantial costs
of litigation. The contingent fee system discourages frivolous
litigation because a contingent fee lawyer has no incentive to
bear the costs of bringing a frivolous claim because there is no
money in it.22
Alternatively, the "tort tax" argument could be relevant if
PPI was to compare the costs and benefits of the current system
with the costs and benefits of an alternative system, such as
self-insurance or government compensation. No such attempt
is made. PPI does have a lot of suggestions for cutting the costs
of the current system; for example, repealing joint and several
liability, capping non-economic damages, etc. However, no ex-
planation is given as to how the protections of the current sys-
tem, in terms of victim recovery and product safety, could be
maintained. In all likelihood, the so-called savings created by
the suggested reforms would give rise to increased costs due to
unsafe products and the need to employ other sources of com-
pensation (such as government funds) for those victims who can
no longer receive full recovery in the courts. 23
PPI relies heavily on the report of a commission which was
appointed by the Governor of New York to investigate the per-
21. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11; Klein v. Seenauth, 687 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. City Civ.
Ct. 1999) (ordering a hearing to determine whether a lawyer's frivolous conduct
justifies a monetary sanction and noting that a court in its discretion may award
costs and financial sanctions against an attorney engaging in frivolous conduct).
22. For the discussion of contingent fees, see infra notes 321-43 and accompa-
nying text.
23. See Michael Schrage, Tort Reform? It's Government Interference in the
Marketplace, L.A. TIMES, March 9, 1995, at Dl (noting that limitations on tort re-
covery, such as damage caps, simply shift the cost of victim compensation from
insurance companies to the government, meaning higher taxes). See also Deborah
Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical
Evidence, 60 OHmO ST. L.J. 315, 397 (1999) (noting that tort reform proposals "uni-
formly and unabashedly favor defendants" and make no attempt to determine
whether the resulting system of compensation is fair or efficient to all parties).
20001 345
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ceived "crisis" in liability insurance in the early 1980s. 24 This
commission was chaired by Judge Hugh Jones. The Jones Com-
mission Report was certainly critical of the tort system, but
even the Jones Commission recognized that alternative systems
of compensation were unlikely to work in our society. 25 Part of
the Jones Commission Report was dedicated to an analysis of
countries that adopted a system of social insurance as a means
of compensating victims for personal injuries. 26 The Jones Com-
mission concluded that
[fioreign compensation systems which have been developed in the
context of societies with broad government social insurance net-
works, and which reflect strongly-held views about the extent of
collective responsibility for individual misfortune cannot be easily
transferred to or even compared with the system that has grown
up in our far more individualistic and market-oriented society.2 7
Thus, to impose limits on tort recovery would shift the costs of
victim compensation to government social programs, hardly the
market-oriented approach that American businesses prefer.
Even if the "tort tax" argument could be addressed in isola-
tion from the costs and benefits of alternative systems of recov-
ery, it would be folly to rely on the PPI analysis as any
indication of the true costs of the tort system. The tort tax fig-
ure is based on a study by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, a business
consulting firm.28 The Tillinghast figures are vastly overinclu-
sive. The figures include not only payouts for personal injury
claims, but also the costs of all insurance premiums, whether
related to tort liability or not.29 The global cost figure also in-
cludes the costs associated with operating the insurance indus-
try, an industry that is not noted for its efficiency. 30 Finally, the
24. HUGH R. JONES ET AL., GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE, INSURING OUR FUTURE VOLUME II: REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE 215-16 (1986) [hereinafter Jones Commission
Report].
25. See id. at 203.
26. See id. at 199-202.
27. Id. at 205.
28. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 22-25.
29. See id. at 24.
30. See id. See, e.g., Guy B. MASSERITZ ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE: A REPORT OF THE U.S. JUSTICE DEPART-
MENT TO THE TASK GROUP ON ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES (January 1977). See also
DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 4 ("The insurance industry is wasteful and ineffi-
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tort costs include the costs created by insurance companies en-
gaged in at least two distasteful "hardball" tactics: refusing to
pay legitimate claims, thus forcing injured citizens to seek re-
dress in the courts; and requiring confidentiality agreements as
a condition to settlement, which means that similarly situated
victims will have to bring a new litigation from scratch. 31
The "tort tax" figure given by PPI is particularly disingenu-
ous given the record profits of insurance companies and their
executives in the last few years.32 Joanne Doroshow reports
that New York auto insurers enjoyed a 117% increase in profits
for the period from 1994 to 1996, from $717 million to $1.57
billion,33 and that insurance premiums during that period in-
creased markedly, by $1.45 billion, 34 even though the payout by
insurers over that period has remained basically constant.35
She also reports that in 1997, forty-two insurance executives re-
ceived compensation of more than $5 million; nine received
more than $10 million.36 Under all these circumstances, any
cries about a "tort tax" are nothing but absurd and self-serving
overkill.
In fact the cost of the tort system to business is remarkably
low when compared to business income and profits. The cost of
product liability in 1993 (measured by insurance premiums)
was 13.5 cents per $100 of retail sales, which is a decrease from
25.9 cents in 1987. 37 A recent survey of U.S. corporations' total
liability risk conducted by Tillinghast (and not even confined to
tort liability) found that from 1993 to 1994 the overall cost of
risk (including workers' compensation and property risks as
well as risk management per $1000 of revenue) fell by 5%,38
dent, leading to excessively high costs, because in many ways the industry is not
competitive.").
31. See Michael Rustad, How the Common Good Is Served by the Remedy of
Punitive Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1997) (noting how improper rejection of
claims by insurers leads to increased costs of litigation).
32. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 7-8.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE EXPERIENCE 1984-1993: A REPORT OF THE INSURANCE GROUP OF
THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA exh. A, col. N (Mar. 1995).
38. See id.
20001 347
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while the cost of liability fell by 22%.39 Notably, PPI does not
rely on or even mention this particular Tillinghast study. Yet
its findings are consistent with data collected by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, which indicates that
liability costs constituted only sixteen cents of every $100 of re-
tail sales in 1995,40 which is less than 2/10 of 1%. The costs in
these studies include not only those associated with jury ver-
dicts and legal costs, but also the costs of paying for
settlements. 41
Thus, the talk of "tort tax" is not only misguided in looking
at the costs of the tort system without considering the costs of
an alternative system; it is also specious because it overstates
the cost of the system to businesses. It also fails to recognize
the obvious benefits of the system, that the system provides
compensation to victims and correspondingly provides incen-
tives for businesses to make safer products.42
2. Tort Law as "Charity"
Assertion:
PPI asserts that the law of torts has evolved into the law of
"contorts," a system that is concerned more on finding a ready
source of payment for loss or injury, and less on whether anyone
did anything wrong.4 Quoting conservative think-tank guru
Peter Huber, PPI states that the tort system will settle for a
wealthy defendant when it cannot find a careless one.44 Accord-
39. See id. at 4.
40. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 7.
41. Id. There are other reliable indications that PPI's assertions about tort
costs are wildly inflated. For example, a study by RAND Corporation calculated
losses from non-fatal accidents to be 175.9 billion dollars a year. Thirty-eight per-
cent of those costs are paid directly by the injured. Tort recovery paid only 3% of
the hospital costs and covered only 7.7 billion of 175.9 billion dollars in personal
losses. See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR Accidental INJURIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 52-54 (1991). This means that the tort system is used to re-
solve far fewer cases than it legitimately could.
42. See GEORGE EADs & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPO-
RATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAw AND REGULATION 106-110 (1983) (find-
ing that the prospect of tort liability has a beneficial effect on business conduct,
leading to development of safer products).
43. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 8.
44. See id. For a cogent attack on Huber's sloppy methodology, spotty and
selective research, and wildly exaggerated and unsubstantiated claims, see Hager,
supra note 18.
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ing to PPI, this legal bias plays into the natural bias that jurors
have in favor of injured plaintiffs and against "deep pocket" cor-
porate defendants. 45
Analysis:
With these broad assertions, PPI launches an attack on
both modern product liability law, and on the system of jury
trials. Yet PPI seriously misstates current product liability law
and expresses a completely unwarranted mistrust in the system
of jury trial.
Under modern product liability law, a defendant can be
held liable for injuries caused to consumers in one of four ways:
1) if the specific product was manufactured with a defect; 2) if
the product line was defectively designed; 3) if the defendant
failed to warn the consumer about dangerous aspects of the
product; and 4) if the defendant made misrepresentations re-
garding quality of the product.46
Manufacturing defect claims arise when a product that is
usually safe was manufactured with a dangerous defect in a
specific instance. Illustrations of mistakes in the manufactur-
ing process include a tire with a weak spot,47 a gun with a safety
lock that will not lock, and an automobile with faulty brakes. 4
If a single product is made with a specific manufacturing defect,
the plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant was neg-
ligent. 49 The rationale for recovery in the absence of proof of
negligence is that the manufacturer is in a far better position to
protect against dangerous defects in the manufacturing process
than is the innocent consumer. 50 Peter Huber himself has
stated that manufacturing defect cases are "rare."51 The busi-
ness community would not care to admit that manufacturing
mistakes, whether negligent or not, are routinely or even occa-
sionally made.
45. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 8-9.
46. See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 1:5, at 16 (3d ed. 2000).
47. See MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
48. See Healey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 663 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1996).
49. See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1981).
50. See id.
51. Hager, supra note 18, at 550.
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PPI's real complaint over "strict liability" is therefore about
claims either that a product is defectively designed, or that the
defendant failed to provide proper warnings concerning the
dangers from use of the product. PPI asserts that businesses
can be held liable for defective design or failure to warn, even
though they were not "careless" or otherwise at fault.52 In fact
claims of defective design and failure to warn are dependent on
a finding of unreasonable conduct on the part of the manufac-
turer.53 A product design creating injury is considered defective
only if the design was "not reasonably safe."54 A design defect
can be proven only by "a comparison between an alternate de-
sign and the design that caused the injury undertaken from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person."55 That is the very standard
that is "also used in administering the traditional reasonable-
ness standard in negligence."56 This means that a manufac-
turer can be held liable for a design defect only if it failed to
employ a reasonable and safer alternative design. 57 As Judge
Posner states, the concept of "unreasonably dangerous design"
brings into play "factors of cost and risk similar to those that
determine negligence, an objective standard that is independ-
ent of what the particular defendant knew or could have
done."5 8 Judge Posner concluded that "in a defective design
case, there is no practical difference between strict liability and
negligence."5 9 Thus, the alleged injustice of liability "regardless
of fault," trumpeted by PPI, is simply a misstatement of the law
and the reality of litigation in defective design cases.
The same is true for "strict liability" claims that are based
on "failure to warn." A manufacturer is liable for failure to warn
52. See generally PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 12-13.
53. See Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983)
(emphasis added).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 2.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 38-39.
58. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984).
59. Id. (quoting Birchfield v. International Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131, 1139
(6th Cir. 1984). "The leading treatise on tort law is in agreement: 'The proof re-
quired of a plaintiff seeking to recover for injuries from an unsafe product is very
largely the same, whether his cause of action rests upon negligence, warranty, or
strict liability in tort.'" Id. (quoting PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 671
(4th ed. 1971)).
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only if that failure was unreasonable, for instance, if the manu-
facturer had reason to know that the product presented a spe-
cific danger, and yet failed to provide an adequate warning
about that danger. As Judge Posner stated, the "strict liability
duty to warn" is "hard to distinguish in practice from the duty
to warn imposed by a negligence standard. This is because the
defendant, to be held strictly liable, must have been able to fore-
see that the product would be unreasonably dangerous unless
there was a warning."60
Thus PPI's attack on the tort system as one in which negli-
gence is irrelevant 6' is a misstatement of existing legal stan-
dards. The PPI attack on what it calls the law of "contorts" is
not only a misguided attack on applicable legal standards; it is
also an attack on the jury system itself. PPI states, without
substantiation, that "countless jury verdicts" have been based
on a misplaced desire to compensate an injured individual at
the expense of a blameless defendant. 62 PPI asserts, in other
words, that juries routinely work on the "deep pocket"
principle.63
An accusation that strikes at the heart of the civil justice
system should presumably be supported by some factual basis.
The PPI report is markedly lacking in facts supporting the
premise that juries have a practice of ruling against deep pocket
defendants. In fact, all recent evidence is to the contrary. For
example, the scholars Valerie Hans and William Lofquist en-
gaged in an extensive, scientific study of Delaware jurors sitting
in suits against corporations.6 They observed, contrary to the
unsubstantiated allegations in the PPI report, that jurors were
suspicious of plaintiffs' claims:
The tort jurors approached their own cases with considerable sus-
picion about the plaintiff. Indeed, in these personal injury law-
suits, jurors focused most on the plaintiffs in the case rather than
on the businesses that were sued.... Jurors' dubiousness about
plaintiff claims led them to scrutinize the personal behavior of
60. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 466.
61. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 8.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 14.
64. See Valerie Hans & William Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Lia-
bility in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 85, 89-90 (1992).
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plaintiffs, trying to understand their motives and to assess the
reasonableness of their claims. Seemingly no aspect of the plain-
tiffs' behavior was beyond question. Jurors often penalized plain-
tiffs who did not meet high standards of credibility and behavior,
including those who did not act or appear as injured as they
claimed, those who did not appear deserving due to their already
high standard of living, those with pre-existing medical condi-
tions, and those who did not do enough to help themselves recover
from their injuries.6 5
In contrast, the jurors were sympathetic to business, and sensi-
tive about the costs to society of a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.
Rather than revealing jurors willing or eager to impose on busi-
ness the costs of plaintiffs' injuries, our findings show that jurors
were suspicious of the legitimacy of plaintiffs' claims and con-
cerned about the personal and social costs of large jury awards.
Despite insistence on product safety and high expectations of
business, jurors were generally favorable toward business, skepti-
cal more about the profit motives of individual plaintiffs than of
business defendants, and committed to holding down awards.
66
The findings of Hans and Lofquist are supported by a De-
partment of Justice Civil Justice Survey of verdicts in state
courts in the seventy-five largest counties in the United
States.67 The statistics show that tort plaintiffs are more likely
to get a favorable verdict from a judge than a jury.68 Plaintiffs
won only 30% of product liability jury trials in the courts sur-
veyed; in contrast, plaintiffs won 70% of the bench trials.6 9 For
all tort cases, the success rate was 47% injury trials and 57% in
bench trials.70 These findings clearly belie the charge that ju-
ries are biased against deep pocket corporations.
7 1
65. Id. at 94-95.
66. Id. at 93.
67. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: CIVIL
TRL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 6 (1999).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. Deborah Merritt and Kathryn Barry surveyed tort verdicts in
Franklin County, Ohio, and found, consistent with the Department of Justice
study, that tort plaintiffs were more likely to be successful in a bench trial than a
jury trial. See Merritt & Barry, supra note 23.
71. In their study of verdicts in an urban county, Deborah Merritt and
Kathryn Barry "found no evidence that juries penalize deep pocket institutional
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The findings of Hans and Lofquist are also quite consistent
with the pattern of jury verdicts in tort cases in New York. Ac-
cording to the New York Jury Verdict Reporter, the percentage
of favorable verdicts for all tort plaintiffs went down, from 54%
to 51% between 1994 and 1998.72 The 39% product liability suc-
cess rate in New York is less than the 40% success rate nation-
ally.73 The number of verdicts of one million dollars or more has
remained steady from 1989, approximately one hundred in the
entire state per year,74 and this is not considering the high
probability that such verdicts are either reduced by the judge in
response to a post-trial motion, or reduced by the appellate
court. All these figures have caused Russell Moran, the director
of New York Jury Verdict Reporter, to conclude that the "tort
reform movement has already been heard, loud and clear, by its
target audience: the jury."75 Indeed, there are some reported
cases in which jurors actually had to be excluded from serving
in a tort case because they had been so biased by the advertis-
ing blitz trumpeting the insurance crisis and the need to limit
plaintiffs' recovery.7 6
In light of all these facts indicating that jurors are not bi-
ased against business and are not engaged in compensating in-
dividuals regardless of fault, it is remarkable that PPI still
seeks to attack the jury system as unjust and biased. Perhaps
it is just out of habit. The "tort reform" movement has been
going on so long that it might be hard to stop even though it has
achieved marked success in the courts. The tort reform move-
ment may have originated years ago from a desire to level the
defendants either by imposing liability more readily or by assessing heavier dam-
ages." Merritt & Barry, supra note 23, at 392.
72. See Torts, Insurance & Compensation Law Section, New York State Bar
Ass'n, New York Jury Verdict Reporter: Statistical Study 143 chart 1 (1999). See
also Merritt & Barry, supra note 23, at 395 (noting that nationwide, median jury
awards for personal injury plaintiffs declined from $65,000 in 1990 to $55,660 in
1996).
73. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal
Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 433, 437 (1996).
74. See id.
75. Russell F. Moran, Juries Are Just Saying No, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 16, 1995, at
A17.
76. See Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the
Size of Damage Awards, 40 Am. U. L. REV. 805, 808-09 (1995) (noting that anti-tort
publicity has biased some jurors to the extent that they have been excluded for
cause because they can no longer be impartial).
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playing field, but it now appears committed to tilting the field in
favor of business, at the expense of the individual.
3. Fear of Lawsuits
Assertion:
PPI claims that the "new frontier" of liability has resulted
in reduction of services and other socially worthwhile activity
due to a fear of lawsuits.77 Two of the more egregious instances
alleged are that people no longer volunteer to manage children's
sports activities, due to the fear that they will be sued "person-
ally over matters as trivial as who got to play on which team,"78
and that employers are placed in a bind with respect to giving
references for departing employees, because the employer will
get sued if a truthful, negative recommendation is given. How-
ever the employer will also get sued if no recommendation is
given.79
Analysis:
The flaws in the overheated "analysis" by PPI of the evils
foisted on society by the tort system are amply indicated by the
two examples cited. Both are based on patently false state-
ments of the law. The supposed threat of liability faced by vol-
unteers is in fact non-existent. As to the litigation concerns of
volunteers, Congress enacted the Volunteer Protection Act of
1997,80 which immunizes volunteers for non-profit or govern-
mental entities from liability for ordinary negligence.8' So PPI's
assertion on this point is nothing but a scare tactic designed to
stir up lawmakers and the public.
The assertion that employers are in an impossible position
with respect to employee references is also insupportable.
Under New York law, an employer cannot be held liable for giv-
ing a reference about an employee unless the employee proves
that the employer maliciously libeled the employee.8 2 Simply
put, if the information is truthful there can be no liability.8 3
77. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 9.
78. Id. at 9-10.
79. See id.
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-05 (1997).
81. See id.
82. See Liberman v. Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d 344, 348 (N.Y. 1992).
83. See id.
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Even if the information is false, the employer is not liable un-
less the employee can prove that the employer was malicious. s4
Presumably, even PPI has no interest in protecting employers
who wish to injure their former employees by transmitting in-
formation they know to be false. Once again, PPI's assertion
that the tort system has harmful effects on societal conduct is
nothing but a scare tactic.
Is it not true, though, that some businesses, people and
even governments, often refuse to conduct certain activity out of
a fear of tort liability? Certainly that is true. Indeed, the very
reason for a tort system of recovery is to discourage careless
conduct and encourage safety. Even PPI cannot say that this is
a bad thing. The threat of tort liability has made products and
conditions far safer than they otherwise would be. Playgrounds
have installed padded surfaces to protect against injury to chil-
dren8 5 and children's sleepwear fabric is now flame-retardant.8 6
Lawsuits have led to improved practice in hospitals and im-
proved security in public buildings.8 7
The common knowledge that the threat of tort liability has
made products and conditions safer is supported by empirical
evidence as well. Joanne Doroshow reports that the Conference
Board, a business-funded research organization, surveyed the
risk managers of more than two hundred major corporations.88
The Board concluded that a notable impact of product liability
is that "products have become safer, manufacturing procedures
have been improved, and labels and use instructions have be-
come more explicit."8 9 Similarly, the Consumer Federation of
America has reported that "approximately 6,000 deaths and
millions of injuries have been prevented on an annual basis now
because of product liability and other forces toward greater
safety in our society."90
In sum, the fear of tort liability does not lead to defensive
activity contrary to society's interests. Rather, it leads to a safer
84. See Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1996).
85. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 19.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 19 (quoting Testimony at Senate Subcom-
mittee on Consumer Rights, September 23, 1993).
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society for everyone. Conversely, any further limitations on tort
liability will undoubtedly lead to unsafe practices, injury and
even death. As an MIT research team has concluded, the tort
system is "the most significant mechanism to keep risk aversion
in the market."91 When the risk of liability is more and more
remote, it makes economic sense that businesses will take
greater and greater risks with our safety, in order to make a
profit.92
4. Disincentives to Innovation
Assertion:
PPI claims that product liability suits have caused many
companies to shy away from development of new and innovative
products and procedures. 93 PPI asserts that new and better
products are not being marketed because businesses are afraid
of lawsuits.94 It states that "[tihe chilling effects of liability law-
suits and mushrooming insurance costs have been especially
dramatic in the pharmaceutical field."95 Also, fear of liability
gives rise to defensive medicine, where physicians "think le-
gally, not clinically."96
Analysis:
If the civil justice system stifled innovation as asserted by
PPI, one would expect a dearth of new products from manufac-
turers, especially pharmaceutical companies. Yet this is clearly
not the case. In a 1991 U.S. News and World Report article, five
firms were highlighted as "beating up foreign competitors as
they slug their way to the global marketplace." 97 Four of the five
91. Id. at 20.
92. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998) (noting the connection between
the risk of liability and a corporation's interest in promoting safety).
93. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 11-12.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 12.
96. Id. at 11-13.
97. Eva Pomice & Warren Cohen, The Toughest Companies in America, U.S.
NEWS & WoRLD REP., Oct. 28, 1991, at 65. This article, and other evidence indicat-
ing that product innovation is not stifled by the tort system, is well-developed by
DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 15-17.
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companies make drugs and medical equipment.98 One of the
companies highlighted was Pfizer, Inc., a New York-based phar-
maceutical firm.99 The article states that "Pfizer's marketplace
victories ultimately stem from massive research investments,"
and noted that Pfizer put $3.5 billion into new product develop-
ment in the previous ten years. 100 The article concluded that
Pfizer's new product lines accounted for 42% of sales, up from
13% only two years earlier. 10' This profile is hardly consistent
with PPI's vision of major companies scared away from innova-
tion due to fear of liability suits. And it is notable that the arti-
cle was written well before major new drugs like Viagra hit the
market.
PPI tries to make something out of the fact that manufac-
turers have withdrawn from the market for vaccines for child-
hood diseases. 10 2 But this cannot be due to liability concerns.
Compensation for any vaccine-related injury was taken out of
the tort liability system by Congress in 1986.103 Under the Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 0 4 a family with a child in-
jured by a vaccine must bring the claim before a Special Master,
and there are substantial damage caps on recovery (a limit of
$250,000 for pain and suffering or death).0 5 The severe limita-
tions on recovery are not unlike those proposed by PPI for all
lawsuits - making it disingenuous to argue that fear of liability
has led to disincentives in the vaccine industry.
Professor Marc Galanter, a respected expert in empirical
research on the civil justice system, states that the charges of
reduced innovation are completely unfounded:
The facts do not support the alleged innovation-liability link.
R&D-to-sales ratios for all industries increased rather substan-
tially during the 1980s.... Significantly, that ratio more than
doubled in the drug industry, where product liability suits have
been especially prevalent. Both the industry-wide and pharma-
98. See Pomice, supra note 97.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 13.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (1997).
104. See id.
105. See id.
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ceutical-specific trends are inconsistent with claims that liability
fears have dampened innovative activities. 06
W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore are two respected re-
searchers who also conclude that liability lawsuits do not stifle
the development of better and safer products. 10 7 They stress an
important point that PPI, in its advocacy, misses: that some
products, new and old, are in fact unreasonably dangerous, and
"the product liability system should force some firms and prod-
ucts out. Similarly, medical malpractice liability should weed
out incompetent physicians who are inflicting substantial inju-
ries on their patients. Society should not cap damages and re-
strict product liability simply because some costs are being
imposed. The real question is whether these costs are justified
given the trade-offs that are involved." 08
Based on an empirical study of industries, including a sur-
vey of CEO's, Viscusi and Moore found that liability law "led to
much more substantial actions to improve product safety. Ac-
tual experiences led to improvements in the safety of particular
products (35%), a restructuring of the product mix to have a
safer product line (33%), and improved product usage and warn-
ings (47%)."109 Based on an econometric model, the scholars
concluded that "product liability has a positive effect on innova-
tion."110 This is because liability law has the salutary effect of
encouraging the development of safer products."' Hopefully
PPI is not griping about the disincentives imposed by liability
lawsuits on the development of unsafe products.
As to development of safe products, PPI's assertion of "sti-
fled innovation"112 is simply without basis. PPI's assertions
about the existence and cost of "defensive medicine" are simply
that - assertions, without any factual basis set forth or even
106. Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L.
REv. 1093, 1147 (1996) [hereinafter Galanter, Real World Torts] (citing Robert E.
Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and Reali-
ties, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 145 (Shuck ed. 1991)).
107. See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship
Between Product Liability and Innovations, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
105 (Shuck ed. 1991).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 114-15.
110. Id. at 123.
111. See id. at 110.
112. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 11-12.
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alluded to.113 The actual studies that have been conducted have
found little or no evidence of "defensive" medicine, but a good
deal of evidence of "safe" medicine in response to liability
concerns.114
For example, the Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA")
has analyzed existing studies and supplemented them with a
national survey of cardiologists, surgeons, and obstetrician/gy-
necologists to determine whether these doctors use unnecessary
procedures due to fear of liability. 115 The OTA concluded that
"[iun the majority of clinical scenarios used in OTA's and other
surveys, respondents did not report substantial levels of defen-
sive medicine, even though the scenarios were specifically
designed to elicit a defensive response."" 6 Importantly, OTA
observed that with a reduced malpractice signal, there could be
a reduction in beneficial defensive medicine." 7 This is a recog-
nition that the tort liability system encourages necessary safety
practices, that could be ignored if liability laws are changed.
The respected researcher Patricia M. Danzon makes a simi-
lar point in her extensive study of medical practices.118 She con-
cludes that the comprehensive data of medical testing
procedures "do not show that malpractice has induced an in-
crease in laboratory tests and X-rays, which are often viewed as
the primary forms of defensive medicine."1 9 She noted that
some doctors discontinued certain high-risk procedures, but
that this response "was more common for generalists than for
board-certified specialists and more common for older physi-
cians."120 In other words, the risk of liability for conducting
high-risk procedures resulted in more specialization; those pro-
cedures were shifted to more highly qualified physicians. Pro-
fessor Danzon concluded that "the pattern of increased referrals
113. See id. at 13.
114. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MED-
ICAL MALPRACTICE, 103d Cong. 56 (1994).
115. See id. at 44-46.
116. Id. at 43-46.
117. See id. at 22-23 (emphasis added).
118. See Patricia M. Danzon, Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the Other
Side Greener?, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 176, 176 (Schuck ed. 1991).
119. Id. at 192.
120. Id. at 194.
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to more technically qualified physicians is consistent with a re-
duction in injury risk."121
Part of the "defensive medicine" mantra is that obstetri-
cians unnecessarily opt for cesarean delivery. However, a study
of obstetrician practices published in the New England Journal
of Medicine found no relationship between cesarean delivery
and the "physician's recent medicolegal experience." 122 Addi-
tionally, researchers found no association between the malprac-
tice experience or exposure of individual physicians and the
higher use of prenatal resources or cesarean deliveries for the
care of low-risk obstetric patients. 23 The study "provides no ev-
idence for the practice of defensive medicine in low-risk
obstetrics."124
5. Reduced Competitiveness
Assertion:
PPI asserts that tort costs leave New York companies and
workers at a competitive disadvantage in the international
market.125 It relies on surveys conducted by business groups,
which appear to indicate that business respondents believe that
the liability system has a negative effect on business. 26
121. Id. at 195. See also Michael Trebilcock et al., Malpractice Liability: A
Cross-cultural Perspective, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 205 (Schuck ed.
1991). The authors contend that claims of "defensive medicine" are largely based
on polls of doctors, and that these polls are unreliable, because they are
biased both in the selection of respondents and in the answers provided: it is
presumably those most concerned about medical malpractice who take the
time to return questionnaires, and their responses are undoubtedly influ-
enced by the very fact of being asked to comment on the effect of liability on
their practices.
Id. at 220. The authors also conclude that the liability system's benefits far out-
weigh the costs of any possible defensive medicine, because the data indicate that
fear of liability "suggests two system impacts for which the benefits of practice
changes probably outweigh the costs: physician communication to patients about
treatment risks and alternatives, and hospital risk management programs." Id. at
231.
122. Gregory L. Goyert et al., The Physician Factor in Cesarean Birth Rates,
320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 706, 706 (1989).
123. See id.
124. Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Defensive Medicine and Obstetrics, 274 J. AM.
MED. AS'N 1606, 1610 (1995).
125. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 14.
126. See id. at 14-15.
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Analysis:
A quick look at the economy belies the assertion that New
York or American businesses are losing their competitive edge
due to the liability system. The economy is clearly healthy, es-
pecially the economy in New York. The president of the Busi-
ness Council of New York State has written that "economic
trends in the Empire State are among the strongest in the coun-
try"'127and has noted that in 1995 and 1996, "manufacturing in-
vestment in the state grew 33%, to more than $10 billion."128
Besides the obvious indicators in the economy, many stud-
ies have shown that American liability laws have little or no
effect on the ability of American businesses to compete. 129 The
OTA has found that the greatest influence on competitiveness is
capital costs. 30 The OTA report did not even mention liability
laws as a factor. 131 The 1987 report of the Conference Board (a
research arm of the business community) concludes that liabil-
ity laws do not have a substantial negative effect on competi-
tiveness. 32 The Conference Board concluded that
the impact of the liability issue seems far more related to rhetoric
than to reality.... For the major corporations surveyed, the pres-
sures of product liability have hardly affected larger economic is-
sues, such as revenues, market share, or employee retention.
Liability lawsuits, which are indeed numerous, are overwhelm-
ingly settled out of court, and usually for sums that are consid-
ered modest by corporate standards. 133
Reviewing the available data on the effect of liability of for-
eign trade competitiveness, Robert Litan, of the Brookings In-
stitution and a co-author of Peter Huber, estimates that the net
cost to business of tort liability is at most 2% of the cost of all
products and services sold in the United States. 34 Because this
127. Daniel B. Walsh, Empire State's Strength, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1998, at
A22.
128. Id.
129. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPETING ECONOMIES: AMERICA,
EUROPE, AND THE PACIFIC RIM 3-7 (1991).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 17 (citing NATHAN WEBER, CONFERENCE
BOARD, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE REPORT No. 893 v (1987).
133. Id.
134. See Litan, supra note 106, at 128.
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cost is so relatively small, Litan concluded that it is "highly un-
likely" that tort liability costs have any effect on American com-
petitiveness with foreign business.135 Litan observes that "[Ilt
is not surprising that there is little connection between liability
costs and export performance by industry"136 because differ-
ences in risk costs are "rather minor"137 and are easily out-
weighed in importance by other effects, such as changing energy
costs. 138 He also notes that "foreigners may be willing to pay for
the added safety that may be built into U.S.-produced goods as
a result of the deterrence features of our tort system."139
PPI asserts that the supposedly higher tort costs in New
York will cause New York to lose businesses and jobs to other
states and countries where the liability laws are more pro-busi-
ness.140 But the liability climate has never been found to be a
significant factor for businesses deciding where to locate.' 4 ' Jo-
anne Doroshow points to a 1993 survey conducted by the Na-
tional Federation of Business, which found that the major
reason given by businesses leaving New York for their reloca-
tion is the comparative tax savings, either a lower corporate in-
come tax in the destination location, or greater tax abatements,
etc. 142 Doroshow found this study consistent with a study of
business executives conducted by Louisiana, which concluded
that "there is no evidence of any relationship at all between the
tort law of a state and that state's relative attractiveness as a
place to do business."143 The conclusion that tort laws are unre-
lated to business location decisions is also consistent with stud-
ies determining that physicians do not consider liability laws
material in deciding where to practice.'"
135. See id.
136. Id. at 143.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Litan, supra note 106, at 128.
140. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 27.
141. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 18.
142. See id. at 17.
143. Id. at 18.
144. See Galanter, Real World Torts, supra note 106, at 1152 (discussing stud-
ies, including a study conducted in Indiana finding that an influx of doctors did not
occur after tort reform, even though the reforms were specifically designed to in-
crease the population of doctors).
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6. Municipal Liability and Anecdotal Evidence
Assertion:
PPI claims that lawsuits against municipalities, especially
New York City, are completely out of control. 145 Anecdotes of
outrageous rewards indicate that juries believe "that the city's
pockets not only are deep, but bottomless."146 Suing the city has
given rise to a cottage industry for lawyers, in the form of a
corporation established by trial lawyers "to catalog holes, une-
ven slabs, and other sidewalk irregularities for which the city
can be held liable."1 47
Analysis:
To hear PPI tell it, it would seem that municipalities never
do anything wrong and that all suits against them are for trivial
or trumped-up matters that should not be brought into the
courts. In fact municipalities, and New York City in particular,
are often responsible for serious dangers and injuries. 148 For ex-
ample, the New York City Comptroller has warned about the
dangers to citizens from the City's crumbling infrastructure. 149
Medical malpractice in city hospitals is alarmingly high, accord-
ing to the Comptroller's Annual Claims Report for 1997.150 In
sum, cities create significant risks to their citizens, risks that
must be regulated by the system of tort liability.
PPI asserts that venal trial lawyers have targeted the City
of New York by creating the Big Apple Pothole Corporation to
catalog grounds for highway and sidewalk-related lawsuits.' 5'
However this is a complete misrepresentation of the facts, and
ignores the reason why such a watchdog corporation was made
necessary. In highway or sidewalk cases, New York law makes
it especially difficult for plaintiffs to recover because of the en-
actment of so-called "pothole laws." 5 2 These laws require that a
145. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 1.
146. Id. at 15.
147. Id. at 14-16.
148. See generally DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 13.
149. See NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, DILEMMA IN THE MIL-
LENNium (1998), noted in DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 9.
150. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 9.
151. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 14.
152. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE, § 7-201(c)(2).
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municipality must receive written notice of a dangerous condi-
tion before an accident occurs or otherwise the municipality can-
not be held liable.153 Thus, if not for organizations like the Big
Apple Pothole Corporation, innocent victims would have no
means of recovery if they were unlucky enough to suffer the first
injury from a dangerous condition. That would be so even if the
condition were open and obvious to the municipality, because
written notice is, for some reason, an irreducible requirement
for finding municipal liability. Far from engaging in harass-
ment of cities, trial lawyers are simply protecting the interests
of citizens by giving the city the notice required by law.
Another prong of PPI's attack is based on a description of
"horror cases" where plaintiffs apparently received outrageous
judgments for minimal or no injuries.M Of course, anecdotal
evidence, even if correctly reported, is no basis for changing a
system that processes thousands of cases per year. Professor
Michael Saks has noted the dangers of relying on anecdotal evi-
dence as a basis for legal change:
The trouble with legislation by anecdote is not just that some of
them are false or misleading. Even if true and accurate, anec-
dotes contribute little to developing a meaningful picture of the
situation about which we are concerned. It makes a difference if
for every ten anecdotes in which an undeserving plaintiff bank-
rupts an innocent defendant, one, ten, one hundred, or one thou-
sand equal and opposite injustices are done to innocent plaintiffs.
The proportion of cases that results in one or the other error, and
the ratio of one kind of error to the other, ought to be of greater
interest to serious policy-makers than a handful of anecdotes on
either side of the issue. Reforms are intended to change that ratio
and the tens of thousands of anecdotes the ratio summarizes. 155
We do not allow experts to testify at a trial that a toxic sub-
stance causes cancer, if the sole basis for the conclusion is the
expert's reliance on anecdotal evidence. 56 Why would we dis-
153. See id.
154. These horror stories are found in PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1,
at 14-16.
155. Michael Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System - and Why Not? 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1162 (1992).
156. See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 720-21
(1998).
364 [Vol. 20:339
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/6
'AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM'
mantle the entire system of tort recovery on the basis of a few
anecdotes?
Reliance on anecdotes such as those used by PPI is particu-
larly unwise where the system-wide evidence indicates that ver-
dicts are not in any sense "out of control." For example, in 1997,
there were about 30,000 cases filed against the City of New
York, 157 according to the New York City Comptroller's Annual
Claims Report, Fiscal Year 1997. Out of all of these claims,
there were only eleven cases in which the City was required to
pay more than $2.5 million. 158 All of these cases involved severe
injuries such as extensive brain damage, blindness, and
paraplegia. 5 9
What's more, the anecdotes used by PPI are largely ficti-
tious. Many are only loosely based on actual fact. Most do not
tell the reader that the allegedly outrageous verdict was sub-
stantially reduced on either post-trial motion or appeal. The
use of these "urban legends" is simply a scare tactic to create a
false impression that the system is awash with frivolous law-
suits and juries that are out of control. 60
The urban legends relied upon by PPI are clouded in mys-
tery, because PPI does not bother to cite any cases by name.
However, research has uncovered some of these cases, and indi-
cates that PPI's rendition of the particular "urban legend" has
little basis in reality.' 61
157. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 10.
158. See id.
159. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 10. The New York Times reports: "In
New York City,.. .29,835 new [tort] claims were filed in 1997. In the same year 38
cases were resolved for $1 million or more, representing 26 percent of the total
paid out that year. The plaintiffs were found to have major injuries like paralysis
and brain damage as a result of accidents with city vehicles and of malpractice at
city hospitals." See Glaberson, supra note 3, at 6.
160. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litig-
ious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 65 (1983) (noting that business interests often
repeat unsubstantiated or incomplete stories of certain verdicts, and eventually
these litigation horror stories rise to the level of "urban legends"). See also Ga-
lanter, An Oil Strike in Hell, supra note 15 (analyzing, and debunking, some of the
contemporary legends of outrageous plaintiff verdicts, including "the best known
contemporary legend, the McDonald's coffee case").
161. See DoRosHow, supra note 12, at 10-13 (debunking PPI's own "urban
legends").
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For example, PPI cites a Bronx jury's award of $4.2 million
to a woman who "slipped on a snowy sidewalk and damaged a
knee joint while chasing her dog."162 This appears to be a take-
off on the facts of Ferguson v. City of New York. 163 In Ferguson,
the plaintiff slipped on an icy sidewalk in front of City property,
that had not been cleared in over two snowfalls, despite notice
to the City. 6 4 The plaintiff suffered a severe knee injury, and
had to have her knee reconstructed. She now walks with a
limp. 165 Most importantly for the power of the urban legend,
the trial judge cut the verdict in half in a post-trial ruling. 66
PPI cites the case of a "subway mugger preying on the eld-
erly" who was awarded $4.3 million for being shot as he was
fleeing the crime scene. 67 This tale is based on McCummings v.
New York City Transit Authority. 68 The jury in that case found
that the officer shot the plaintiff in the back, and that the plain-
tiff was unarmed. 69 This was in violation of a clear ruling of
the United States Supreme Court prohibiting the use of deadly
force on unarmed suspects fleeing the scene of a theft. 170 More-
over, the jury verdict may well have been affected by the of-
ficer's implausible account that the fleeing plaintiff was actually
charging the officer when the officer shot him in the back.' 7 '
PPI cites the supposed case of a Bronx jury that awarded $6
million to the family of "a drunk who fell in front of a subway
train, finding him wholly without blame." 72 In the actual case,
Clarke v. New York City Transit Authority, 7 3 the trial judge re-
duced the verdict to $1 million. 74 Then, on appeal, the Appel-
late Division reversed the entire judgment because the trial
162. Id. at 10.
163. See id. (citing Ferguson v. City of New York, No. 7745/89, Bronx Co. Sup.
Ct.).
164. See id. at 10-11.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 11.
167. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 15.
168. 613 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y. 1st Dep't 1993).
169. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 11.
170. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). See also DOROSHOW, supra
note 12, at 11.
171. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 11.
172. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 15.
173. 580 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1st Dep't 1992).
174. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 11.
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judge had wrongly excluded evidence that could have proved
that the plaintiff was at fault in falling off the tracks. 175 In
other words, the jury that supposedly found the plaintiff "wholly
without blame" was never given any evidence that the plaintiff
had acted carelessly.
PPI also cites a case in which "the height of absurdity is
reached" 76 when a jury in a medical malpractice action
awarded $27 million to the injured patient, "and another $6
million to the members of his family, who hadn't even sued."177
In the actual case, a teenager was injured from a fall and was
then rendered a quadriplegic due to lack of care and maltreat-
ment at a city hospital. 78 By the time of the verdict, the plain-
tiff was in his thirties, confined to a wheelchair, and suffering
from excruciating pain, kidney failure, and various infections. 179
The trial judge reduced the verdict from $27 million to $11 mil-
lion, and $6 million of that latter figure was designated recovery
for future custodial care of the plaintiff.80 Such an award is not
a "payment" to the members of the family, but rather a payment
to the plaintiff himself, in order to defray some of the expenses
caused by the hospital's gross negligence.' 8 '
PPI describes a $650,000 verdict against New York City in
the case of a drunk driver, who collided with another car while
traveling the wrong way on the Hutchinson River Parkway. 8 2
The jury granted recovery even though, according to PPI, it was
entirely possible that the driver failed to heed obvious warning
signs. 83 In the actual case, Torelli v. City of New York, 184 the
Appellate Division declared that the evidence at trial "showed
that wrong-way access to the Parkway via the Baychester Ave-
nue exit could easily be had by way of a simple right turn" from
a local street. 85 Although such a turn would, of course, be haz-
175. See Clarke, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 225-26.
176. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 15.
177. Id.
178. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 11 (discussing Ebert v. New York City
Health and Hospitals Corp., No. 13075/77, Kings Co. Sup. Ct.).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 15.
183. See id.
184. 574 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dep't 1991).
185. DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 12.
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ardous, the City had failed to place any "Do Not Enter" signs on
the ramp and, to compound the danger, the City had placed a
number of "No Parking" signs "located so that they faced oncom-
ing wrong way traffic, which would imply to a driver that he
was headed in the correct direction."18 6 Indeed, the City did not
even dispute, on appeal, that its carelessness had created a dan-
gerous situation. 187 The City simply argued that the driver
must have used a different exit. 8 Yet there was substantial
evidence that the driver had actually used the dangerous exit to
enter the Parkway the wrong way.189 Thus, when the true facts
of the case are known, this is not an outrageous verdict at all;
rather it is an instance of compensation for an innocent driver
who was placed at risk and injured due to the City's careless-
ness. Moreover, PPI ignores the fact that the verdict was re-
duced by the appellate court to $250,000.190
Finally, PPI describes a case in which the Saratoga County
town of Greenfield was supposedly bankrupted by a $3.7 million
verdict in favor of a man who fractured his spine while riding a
toboggan down a town-owned hill.' 9' However PPI fails to note
two important facts. First, the trial court reduced the award by
a third.192 Second, the town board ignored warnings from a
Highway Superintendent that the hill was poorly maintained,
and that children were "flying down the hill and being thrown
from their sleds and bruised."193
The president of PPI, David Shaffer, was asked by the New
York Times to respond to the charges that PPI had misrepre-
sented the cases set forth in its "parade of horrors" argument.
Mr. Shaffer is quoted as responding that "[iit is impossible to
include complete information about everything." 194 It is not im-
possible to include information that verdicts have been substan-
tially reduced or overturned. And is not impossible to
accurately state the facts of a reported case. The goal of PPI
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See Torelli, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
191. See Sena v. Town of Greenfield, 696 N.E.2d 996 (N.Y. 1998).
192. See DoRosHow, supra note 12, at 12.
193. Id.
194. Glaberson, supra note 3.
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appears to be to throw a bunch of fictional litigation stories into
the public fray, to see what sticks. The accusation always sticks
in the public mind, long after the rebuttal is forgotten.
The Phenomenon of Undercompensation of Victims
PPI's misleading anecdotal evidence lies in stark contrast
with compelling evidence that victims with extremely serious
injuries are being undercompensated. As discussed above, the
average plaintiffs verdict in New York in all tort cases, accord-
ing to New York Jury Verdict Reporter, is not in the millions,
but it is approximately $50,000. The portion of tort recoveries
attributable to "pain and suffering" has been steadily
decreasing.195
Scholars investigating jury verdicts have noted a marked
underpayment in cases where plaintiffs suffer major damages;
this includes an insurance industry study concluding that
claimants with more than $1 million of legitimate economic loss
are awarded an average of only fifty-eight cents on the dollar by
juries.196 Summarizing the many studies concerning loss re-
placement rates for product liability, the economist W. Kip Vis-
cusi states that "the common belief that product liability
awards lead to windfall gains is erroneous .... The actual
value of court awards and settlements is... often less than the
actual losses suffered by the victim." 197 Viscusi concluded that
those with losses of over $1 million recover only .05% of their
total losses, economic and otherwise. 98 A recent study of medi-
cal malpractice awards found that every 1% increase in actual
loss resulted only in an additional .01% to .02% increase in
195. See Galanter, Real World Torts, supra note 106, at 1123; David Leebron,
Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
256, 305 (1989) ("In the cases after 1940, conscious pain and suffering averaged a
fairly consistent 22% of the award, whereas for the years prior to 1940, it averaged
37% of the total award.").
196. See LAWRENCE W. SouLAR, RESEARCH DEP'T, ALLIANCE OF AMER. INSUR-
ERS, A STUDY OF LARGE PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1985, at 18 (1986).
The findings that victims with major injuries are undercompensated is confirmed
by a study of verdicts rendered in Franklin County, Ohio. See Merritt & Barry,
supra note 23, at 315 (1999).
197. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social In-
surance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6
YALE J. ON REG. 65, 95-96 (1989).
198. See id. at 96.
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awards. 199 Another study of verdicts in an urban county con-
cludes that plaintiffs with serious injuries, including death, fare
less well at trial.200
As to settlements, the evidence again indicates undercom-
pensation: more than 90% of tort actions settle out of court, and
on average tort claims settle for 74% of their potential recov-
ery.20' Given the prevalence of statistics showing undercom-
pensation of innocent victims rather than windfall recoveries,
PPI's use of inaccurate horror stories is nothing short of
irresponsible.
7. The Scaffold Law
Assertion:
PPI assails § 240 of the New York Labor Law, also known
as the "Scaffold Law."20 2 The Scaffold Law imposes a nondele-
gable duty to provide certain protections to reduce the chance of
accidents that might occur due to elevation-related risks.203 PPI
argues that trial lawyers have exploited the Scaffold Law as a
"Safe Place to Sue Law."20 4 PPI claims that a construction con-
tractor or construction site owner faces absolute liability, "even
if the worker is injured after disregarding a safety warning, or
after consuming alcohol or using drugs."20 5
Analysis:
The Scaffold Law holds owners and contractors liable for
injuries to construction workers caused by their failure to pro-
vide certain important safety devices, such as sturdy ladders,
safety belts, and the like.20 6 The Legislature recognized that
199. See Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malprac-
tice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAw & Soc'y REV. 997, 1019 (1990).
200. See Merritt, supra note 23, at 339-40. The authors note research indicat-
ing that "this kind of pattern derives from jurors' psychological defenses - jurors
blame the victims of accidental harm when injuries are severe because they do not
want to believe that such devastating injuries could happen to them." Id.
201. See Danzon, supra note 118, at 30.
202. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 6.
203. See Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 912, 914 (N.Y. 1993).
204. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 16.
205. Id.
206. See Gordon, 626 N.E.2d at 914.
370 [Vol. 20:339
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/6
'AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM'
special risks arise when workers are working at an elevation. 207
The Scaffold Law is designed to place the responsibility for
workers' safety against elevation-related risks squarely on the
owners and contractors rather than on the workers. 208 This is
hardly unreasonable since it is the owners and contractors, not
the workers, who control the safety conditions at the site.
It would, of course, be unreasonable if, as asserted by PPI,
workers could recover even if they were drunk or on drugs, or
even if they disregarded a safety warning. This is definitely not
the case. In recent years the New York courts have imposed
substantial, reasonable limitations on the scope of the Scaffold
Law. These limitations are conveniently ignored in the PPI re-
port. For example, there is no liability if the worker defied
safety orders.20 9 Moreover, courts have emphasized that the ap-
plication of the Scaffold Law is called for "under only very lim-
ited circumstances;" that is, only where the worker suffers harm
from a risk "related to elevation differentials."210 For example,
a worker seriously injured by falling debris was held not pro-
tected by the scaffold law, because none of the safety devices
required by the statute (e.g., scaffolds, hoists, stays) would have
made any difference, and the worker was not above the ground
at the time of the accident. 211
Likewise, in Melo v. Consolidated Edison Co.,212 a worker
hit by a falling steel plate that was dropped from a backhoe at a
construction site was held not entitled to the protection of the
Scaffold Law, because both the plaintiff and the steel plate were
on the ground when the injury occurred. 213 The court declared
that the statute addresses only "special elevation risks."214
207. See Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., 657 N.E.2d 1318 (N.Y. 1995).
208. See Gordon, 626 N.E.2d at 914.
209. See id.
210. Lawrence v. Finch Pruyn Co., 891 F. Supp. 75, 78 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
211. See id.
212. 702 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1998).
213. See id. at 833-34.
214. Id. See also Maggi v. Innovax Methods Group, 672 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (2d
Dep't 1998) ("Labor Law section 240(1) is directed at elevation-related hazards
only, and recovery under the statute is unavailable where the injury results from
other types of hazards even if proximately caused by the absence of a scaffold or
other required safety device."); Curtis v. Halmar Corp., 672 N.Y.S.2d 409 (2d Dep't
1998) (no Scaffold Law liability where the plaintiff got on a ladder to put some-
thing up that he could have reached from the ground).
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Thus, the scope of the Scaffold Law is quite limited. Own-
ers and contractors are liable only if they refuse to provide
safety equipment that is necessary to protect workers above the
ground, and then only if the failure or absence of the safety
equipment caused the injury.215 Owners and contractors will
not be liable if the worker ignores safety warnings or refuses to
use safety equipment. 216 Furthermore, there is no liability
under the Scaffold Law if the defendant can show that the
worker's injury was the result of the worker being drunk or on
drugs.217
Surveying the recent case law developments on the Scaffold
Law, Justice Andrew V. Siracuse has concluded that "what was
once considered to be a form of absolute liability has now taken
on the character of negligence."218 Because of two defenses,
proximate cause and a "recalcitrant worker" defense, the courts
have aggressively employed to preclude liability under the Scaf-
fold Law. Courts have used the proximate cause requirement to
excuse liability when the worker was as fault.219 In such cases,
the accident is considered proximately caused by the worker's
own negligence or wrongdoing.220 Similarly, the courts have
been gravitating toward the position that a worker who is negli-
gent has essentially refused to use the safety features provided,
and therefore is a "recalcitrant worker" denied the protections
of the Scaffold Law.221 This developing case law has led Justice
Siracuse to conclude that "recalcitrance has come to mean negli-
215. See Melber v. 6333 Main Street, 698 N.E.2d 933 (N.Y. 1998) (no Scaffold
Law liability where the plaintiff tripped over a conduit while using stilts to put up
a drywall; the stilts performed the function required of them - they allowed the
plaintiff to safely complete his work on the drywall; no safety devices set forth in
the statute could have prevented the injury).
216. See generally Hon. Andrew V. Siracuse, In Scaffold Cases, Courts Are
Moving from Absolute to Relative Liability, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1999, at 1 [hereinaf-
ter Scaffold Cases].
217. See Kijak v. 330 Madison Ave. Corp., 675 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1st Dep't 1998)
(no liability where defendant proves that the worker's alcohol or drug impairment
was the proximate cause of his injuries).
218. Siracuse, Scaffold Cases, supra note 216, at 1.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 1 (noting that in recent Scaffold Law cases "it is hard to see
how the proximate cause issue can be distinguished from a back-door reintroduc-
tion of comparative negligence").
221. See Hon. Andrew V. Siracuse, Defense of Contributory Negligence Has
Returned to Scaffold Law Cases, N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1999, at 1.
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gence" and that the "paradoxical result of lowering the thresh-
old of recalcitrance is that Scaffold Law plaintiffs, once the most
favored in law, are becoming the most severely penalized for
their own negligence."222 Thus, PPI's overheated analysis of the
Scaffold Law is simply incorrect.
8. The No-Fault Law
Assertion:
The New York no-fault law is designed to minimize litiga-
tion of automobile accidents by providing for the automatic re-
imbursement of damages by insurers, in exchange for which
policyholders are denied the right to sue unless they have suf-
fered "serious injury."223 PPI asserts that plaintiffs' lawyers
and compliant courts have expanded the "serious injury" excep-
tion so that now virtually anyone involved in an accident can
claim a "serious injury" and thereby get out from under the no-
fault restriction.224
Analysis:
There is simply no basis in the case law for concluding that
the "serious injury" exception to the no-fault rule is being di-
luted or evaded. The New York courts have been quite vigilant
in scrutinizing plaintiffs' claims of serious injury, and in re-
jecting such claims where the injuries are minor or insuffi-
ciently proven. The cases rejecting claimed injuries that were
not serious are legion. For example, in Stowe v. Simmons,225
the plaintiff suffered "from recurrent cervical and lumbosacral
spine sprain and radiculitis with specified degrees of restriction
of motion."226 This was held not sufficient to meet the "serious
injury" threshold.227 Similarly in Kern v. Ash,228 the plaintiff
suffered a cervical strain and substantial neck pain, and con-
sistently complained of "persistent" pain. 229 The Court held
222. Id. at 5.
223. N.Y. INS. LAw § 5102 (McKinney 1985).
224. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 16-17.
225. 676 N.Y.S.2d 638 (2d Dep't 1998).
226. Id. at 639.
227. See id.
228. See 676 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dep't 1998).
229. See id. at 297.
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that these injuries were not serious enough to pass the no-fault
threshold.230 In Curry v. Velez, 231 the plaintiff lost four weeks of
work after a car accident, suffered sporadic back pain, and testi-
fied as being permanently unable to lift heavy objects. 232 Yet
this was held not to be "serious injury."233
Thus the serious injury threshold clearly has been set at a
high level by the courts, in accordance with the terms of the no-
fault statute. Moreover, the New York courts have required
that the stringent standard must be met by strong, objective
proof. Claims of serious injury supported only by the plaintiffs
own complaints, by affidavits of attorneys, or by conclusory affi-
davits by doctors, are routinely found to be insufficient. Rather,
the plaintiff must present recent objective medical evidence of a
serious impairment.234
The only case cited by PPI as evidence that plaintiffs law-
yers and compliant courts are evading the no-fault law is Sav-
age v. Delacruz.235 PPI cites that case as one in which the
plaintiff was permitted to sue for injuries as minor as a
sprained ankle and scars on one knee.236 In fact, the plaintiff
provided uncontroverted, objective medical proof that he walked
with a limp as a result of the accident, and this limp was diag-
230. See id. at 298.
231. 663 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1997).
232. See id. at 64.
233. See id. See also Thousand v. Hedberg, 672 N.Y.S.2d 579, 580 (4th Dep't
1998) (diagnosed cervical and lumbar strain does not meet serious injury stan-
dard); Williams v. Ciaramella, 673 N.Y.S.2d 186, (2d Dep't 1998) (permanent im-
pairment of the shoulder is not serious injury).
234. See Cabri v. Park, 688 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (2d Dep't 1999) (medical reports
not sufficient to prove serious injury where they were not based on a recent exami-
nation of the injured plaintiff). See also Castano v. Synergy Gas Corp., 672
N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (2d Dep't 1998) (affidavits are rejected where tailored to meet
the statutory requirements); Merisca v. Alford, 663 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (2d Dep't
1997) (quoting Antoniou v. Duff, 612 N.Y.S.2d 430, 430 (2d Dep't 1994) ("Conclu-
sions, even of an examining doctor, which are unsupported by acceptable objective
proof, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment directed to the
threshold issue of whether the plaintiff has suffered serious physical injury."));
Rum v. Pam Transport, Inc., 673 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (2d Dep't 1998) (plaintiffs self-
serving affidavit that he was kept out of work by his injury for six months did not
meet the statutory requirements); Castano v. Synergy Gas Corp., 672 N.Y.S.2d
417, 418 (2d Dep't 1998) (affidavits tailored to meet the statutory requirements are
insufficient; plaintiffs subjective assertions of pain are not enough).
235. 474 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dep't 1984).
236. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 17.
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nosed as a permanent condition. 237 The court noted also that
the defendant did not bother to try to submit any competent
proof that the plaintiffs injuries were not serious.238 The de-
fendant relied only on conclusory assertions from insurance
counsel, and unsworn conclusory affidavits of a defense
doctor.239
Savage is hardly good authority for a general assertion that
the serious injury standard has been eviscerated. Even weaker
is PPI's assertion that "the loosening of the serious injury stan-
dard would appear to be the most plausible explanation for a
significant jump in motor vehicle tort suits." 240 First, it is clear
that the serious injury standard has not been loosened. Second,
a more plausible explanation for any rise in motor vehicle tort
suits is the increasing unwillingness of insurance companies to
pay claims. According to the Task Force on Automobile Insur-
ance, empanelled by Assembly Speaker Silver, independent re-
ports indicate that "several large insurance carriers have
recently instituted an across-the-board policy of refusing to set-
tle low-value injury claims, thereby forcing an increased
number of lawsuits for recovery on claims which previously
would have been settled quickly as a matter of course."241 The
report also notes that "many lawsuits would not be necessary if
carriers handled claims in a timely manner."242 The insurance
industry is a far more likely culprit in any increase in automo-
bile tort litigation than is the plaintiffs bar. Finally, the Office
of Court Administration statistics indicate that filings in auto-
mobile cases have leveled off.243 Motor vehicle filings in both
1996 and 1997 hovered around the 42,000 mark, which can
hardly be deemed out of reasonable range given the number of
car accidents in New York.244
237. See Savage, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 17.
241. SPEAKER'S TASK FORCE ON AUTO. INS., ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL 1994-1998:
NEW YORK'S MoVE TO THE Top OF THE LIST IN AUTO INSURANCE RATES 8 (1998).
242. Id. (citing Henry E. Strawn, Director of Insurance for the American Arbi-
tration Association).
243. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 25.
244. See id.
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9. The Crisis in Liability Insurance
Assertion:
Relying on the Jones Commission report, PPI concludes
that a surge in lawsuits has created a liability crisis that must
be checked by imposing limitations on tort recovery. 245
Analysis:
Subsequent research has shown that the assertions in the
Jones Commission report were unfounded. Even the Jones
Commission could not categorically state that the insurance
"crisis" of the mid-1980s was caused by an increase in lawsuits
and recoveries. The report notes the absence of research estab-
lishing a precise quantitative linkage between tort law changes
and the availability and affordability of liability insurance. 246 It
states that no research currently available quantifies the
linkage or even irrefutably establishes that such a linkage
exists.247
In fact, the evidence now indicates that the insurance crisis
was caused not by lawsuits, but rather by a cyclical downturn
combined with questionable underwriting practices and a drop
in interest rates. The cause of the insurance "crisis" has been
well-described by Professor Eliot M. Blake, an expert on the in-
surance industry.
Like many industries, the insurance industry operates on a cycle.
This cycle is fueled by interest rates because insurers use premi-
ums to generate investment income. When interest rates are
high, insurers underwrite risks at artificially low rates in order to
increase investable cash flow, hoping the ultimate investment
gains from the additional premiums offset the losses resulting
from charging relatively bargain prices for insurance. This pro-
cess is called "cash flow underwriting." Ultimately, rates are in-
creased when the losses from the cut-rate insurance catch up with
insurers. The pattern is three years of rate increases followed by
three years of declining rates. Industry experts characterize the
1985 rate surge as a direct result of an unusually long six-year
price cutting war in the industry. In that cycle, investment deci-
sions were made based on the widespread but mistaken belief
245. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 19.
246. See JONES ET AL., supra note 24, at 12.
247. See id.
376 [Vol. 20:339
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/6
'AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM'
that high interest rates would stay high. As a result, investment
gains were not substantial enough to overcome underwriting
losses, and the resulting series of rate increases has been particu-
larly severe. 248
Even the president and chief executive officer of American
International Group, Inc., a leading insurance company, has
stated that the insurance industry's "crisis" was caused by price
cuts "to the point of absurdity" in the 1980s. 249 He also stated
that the criticism of the tort system was simply an excuse for
industry mismanagement. 250 This is consistent with a 1986 re-
port on the insurance industry by the National Association of
Attorneys General, which declared that the available data indi-
cate "that the causes of, and therefore the solutions to, the cur-
rent crisis lie within the insurance industry itself."25 1
Professor Mark Hager sums up the cries about the insur-
ance crisis this way:
Insurance industry propaganda has often portrayed the "insur-
ance crisis" as a deep threat to insurance profitability posed by
excessive tort liability. Evidence suggests, however, that no "in-
surance crisis" of this sort really exists. Instead, insurance inter-
ests have blamed tort liability for intervals of poor profit actually
stemming from other causes. They have meanwhile used the ex-
cessive liability notion to justify price hikes, coverage cutbacks,
and legislative "tort reform."... The insurance industry did expe-
rience a profit crunch during the years 1981-1983 but, as industry
studies themselves acknowledge, this crunch was not the result of
expanded tort liability .... In the climate of high interest rates
that prevailed in the late 1970s, insurers sought to expand their
investment levels in order to capitalize on returns yielded by high
interest rates. To generate investment capital, they maximized
premium inflows by aggressively writing coverage. The competi-
tion for the coverage markets which generated premium inflows
248. Eliot M. Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and
Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 411-12 (1988).
249. Statement of Maurice Greenberg, quoted in Greenwald, Insurers Must
Share Blame: AIG Head, Bus. INs., Mar. 31, 1986.
250. See Hager, supra note 18.
251. Noted in DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 33. See also Kenneth S. Abraham,
The Causes of the Insurance Crisis, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY 54 (1988) (dis-
cussing studies indicating that the insurance crisis was more likely precipitated by
the business practices of the insurance industry rather than abuses in the tort
system).
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led the insurance firms actually to slash premium prices. Profits
then plummeted in the early 1980s as investments soured, at the
same time that premium prices were at rock bottom. Insurers
then scrambled to restore profitability through price hikes and
cost cutting, including coverage cutbacks. By 1986, the industry
was posting record-high profits.
The profit crunch of the early 1980s prompted insurance industry
pressure on state regulators and legislatures; these pressures led
to successful rate hikes and "tort reform" proposals. Some states
apparently passed "tort reform" with the hope of alleviating up-
ward insurance cost pressures supposedly exerted by runaway
tort liability. In the aftermath, however, insurance studies now
claim the new "tort reform" laws actually create no significant op-
portunities for rate cutting. Premium charges, industry studies
now tell us, are scarcely affected by the liability payouts curbed in
"tort reform" schemes .... Far from solving a public crisis in in-
surance rates, "tort reform" begins to look more like a windfall for
insurers, paid for at the expense of tort victims. 252
To put it simply, there is no liability-induced insurance crisis.
PPI's contention that the recovery of innocent victims must be
further limited in order to protect the insurance industry is
completely without factual basis.
10. The "Rising Tide" of Tort Claims and Tort Recoveries
Assertion:
PPI claims that there is an explosion of tort litigation in
New York, evidenced by a marked increase in filings. 253 This
explosion has allegedly led to wildly increased recoveries for
tort plaintiffs and their lawyers. 254
252. Hager, supra note 18, at 568 (citations omitted). See also Insurance In-
dustry Losses Questioned, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 16, 1986, at A21, in
which Rep. Peter W. Rodino (D. N.J.), stated that the House Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law had, in the course of investi-
gating the causes of the insurance crisis, discovered that the liability insurance
industry received far more in premiums than it paid out in claims. Congressman
Rodino noted that this finding was "extremely significant" for policymakers consid-
ering the so-called insurance crisis, because it "raises the specter of price-gouging
and bloated profits" since "carriers claim they pay out more than they take in."
253. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 28-35.
254. See id.
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Analysis:
There has been no "explosion" of tort litigation in New
York. The "statistics" relied upon by PPI are misleading and
incomplete. PPI reports that the number of tort claims filed in
New York courts rose from 53,104 to 84,809 during the period
from 1988 to 1994.255 However, this bare statistic of tort filings
ignores an important fact. In 1992, the legislature enacted new
procedures for bringing a lawsuit in New York. Before that
time, a lawsuit began by serving a summons and complaint on
the adversary; no legal papers had to be filed in any court. A
case was not filed, and therefore not counted in the statistics,
until the plaintiff purchased an index number. Many, if not
most, lawsuits were settled or abandoned before an index
number was purchased. Since 1992, however, an index number
must be purchased at the time the summons and complaint is
served, and it is at that time that the filing is counted. 25 6 Many
claims that were not part of the tabulation (i.e., those settled or
abandoned at an early stage in the process) before 1992 are now
tabulated. Thus, given the change in the very system of how
claims are tabulated, there is no way to tell from the bare figure
cited by PPI whether tort claims are actually up, down, or
constant.
It is also notable that PPI itself asserts that much of the
rise in tort claims, if any, is caused by an increase in motor ve-
hicle accident claims. 257 As stated previously in this Essay, any
increase in automobile accident filings is more likely caused by
insurance company intransigence than by plaintiff
litigiousness.
Nationwide statistics collected by the U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and the National Center for
State Courts dispel the myth of any kind of tort explosion. 258
Tort litigation has been stable since 1986, and in relative de-
255. See id. at 30.
256. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 306-a (McKinney 1992).
257. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 31-33.
258. See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES at 2 (1995). See also
CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: CIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS (1992).
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cline since 1990.259 The rate of tort filings in New York, accord-
ing to the National Center for State Courts, is about average
when compared to the other states.260 For example, in New
York Supreme Court in 1988, there were 181 tort filings for
every 100,000 persons.261 This was more than the 79 out of
100,000 in Utah, but less than the 280 out of 100,000 figure in
Tennessee. 262 The Office of Court Administration figures indi-
cate that filings in non-automobile tort cases in New York have
actually gone down over the last three years, from 39,237 to
36,189.263
If we want to look anywhere for a "litigation explosion" we
should look to mega-lawsuits between businesses. For example,
the filing rate for business contracts cases in the state courts
has risen 258% since 1960, while the rise in tort cases was less
than half that figure.264 According to data from the National
Center for State Courts, ten times as many contracts cases are
filed as product liability and medical malpractice cases com-
bined.265 In contrast, tort suits make up only 9% of state court
filings.266
The assertion of a litigation explosion is remarkably at odds
with the findings of virtually every empirical study of the civil
justice system: that there are not too many claims, but rather
too few. 267 The vast majority of injured individuals never bring
a claim. 268 Professor Michael Saks sums it up this way:
One of the most remarkable features of the tort system is how few
plaintiffs there are. A great many potential plaintiffs are never
heard from by the injurers or their insurers. The first and most
259. See id.
260. See Saks, supra note 155, at 1206 (illustrating table setting forth data
from the National Center for State Courts).
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See New York Office of Court Administration, Report on Case Filings
(1997) (on file with author).
264. See Paul M. Barrett, Litigation Boom? Professor Turns Up a New Cul-
prit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1998, B1.
265. See Saks, supra note 155.
266. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COMPOSITION OF TORT FILINGS,
GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS (1991, 1992) (noting that the evidence
'points to tort litigation growing more slowly than civil litigation generally").
267. See Saks, supra note 155, at 1183.
268. See id.
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dramatic step in this process of nonsuits is the failure of so many
of the injury victims to take measures to obtain compensation
from those who injured them.269
Professor Saks' conclusions concerning underclaiming ,are
supported by a remarkable wealth of data. For example:
" A "study of California medical malpractice found that at most
only 10% of negligently injured patients [as determined by an
independent board of review] sought compensation for their
injuries. Even for those who suffered major, permanent inju-
ries (the group with the highest probability of seeking compen-
sation) only one in six filed."270
" A "Harvard Medical Practice Study found that in New York
State, 'eight times as many patients suffer an injury from
medical negligence as there are malpractice claims. Because
only about half the claimants receive compensation, there are
about sixteen times as many patients who suffer an injury
from negligence as there are persons who receive compensa-
tion through the tort system.'"271
* "A major study of a wide range of civil litigation (not just torts)
found that for every one thousand grievances (events for
which an injury was noticed), 718 became claims (the victim
brought the problem to the alleged wrongdoer's attention), 449
became disputes (the complainant and the alleged wrongdoer
failed to reach an agreement on the matter), 103 were brought
to the attention of a lawyer, and 50 became filed cases."272
Thus, only 10% of grievances came to the attention of lawyers,
and only 5% became filed cases.
* "The RAND Corporation's study of people's responses to disa-
bling injury found that of every one hundred injured, eighty-
one immediately decided to take no action at all. Of the
nineteen who considered making some sort of claim for com-
269. Id.
270. Id. (citing California Medical Association and California Hospital Ass'n,
Report on the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study 101 (1977)).
271. Id. at 1183-84 (quoting HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS,
DOCTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT
COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 7-1 (1990) (noting also that about 2500 cases of per-
manent total disability resulted from medical negligence in New York hospitals in
1984)).
272. Saks, supra note 155, at 1184 (citing Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat,
Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 525, 544 (1981)). See also B. CUm'AN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: A
FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1977).
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pensation, two dealt directly with the injurer, four with the
insurer, and seven consulted a lawyer (of whom four engaged
the lawyer but only two filed suit); six did nothing. Thus, 87%
are not heard from by the injurer or insurer, and only 2% be-
come filed lawsuits."2 73
* "A study that examined how patients responded to medical
care they deemed to be seriously unsatisfactory found that
26% did nothing, 46% changed doctors, 25% talked to their
doctor directly, and 9% contacted lawyers although none of
them ultimately filed a suits." 274
* Given the substantial evidence of underclaiming, it follows
that even if there were a slight increase in filings, it would
simply mean that some victims who have historically been in-
jured without remedy have now chosen to assert their legal
rights. PPI implies that litigation is itself a bad thing and
that we would have a better society if there was no tort litiga-
tion at all. But of course this is not the case. It is true that
frivolous litigation is a bad thing, but PPI provides no evi-
dence whatsoever that any increased tort claim activity is friv-
olous. To the contrary, given the demonstrated rate of
underclaiming by tort victims, there is every reason to believe
that increased tort claim activity, if any, would denote the pos-
itive trend of more innocent victims asserting their legitimate
rights.
As to the alleged crisis in jury awards, as opposed to filings,
PPI refers to New York's "large verdicts" and states that the
median verdict for all types of cases in New York was estimated
at $273,000, "roughly five times the national median."275 PPI
also relies on a report by Jury Verdict Research for the proposi-
tion that New York juries "tend to award far more in damages
for the most commonly claimed injuries in tort cases than juries
elsewhere in the country."276
This so-called "evidence" of unusually large verdicts in New
York is unscientific and misleading. There are at least three
major defects in PPI's conclusion: 1) use of Jury Verdict Re-
273. Id. at 1185 (citing HENSLER ET AL., supra note 41, at 122).
274. Id. at 1185 (citing Marilyn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their
Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 105, 108
(1990)).
275. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 34.
276. Id.
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search ("JVR") inquiries, a notoriously unscientific reporting
system; 2) failure to consider post-verdict reductions; and 3)
failure to mention contrary statistics from more reliable re-
searchers. These defects will be discussed in turn.
Jury Verdict Research:
Jury Verdict Research collects information about verdicts
in a most unsystematic manner. JVR relies on reporting by in-
volved lawyers, word of mouth, media reports, and the like.
JVR does not do original research into actual verdicts. 277 JVR
data is also skewed because it states a "median" without includ-
ing defense verdicts and take nothing verdicts. 278 Since defend-
ants win most personal injury cases in New York City
suburbs, 279 it is obvious that the actual median verdict is far
below that stated by JVR.
JVR itself disclaims the capacity of its data to provide the
evidentiary significance attributed to it by PPI. JVR's chairman
is on record as stating that "JVR has neither asserted nor pub-
lished any conclusions that the average size of jury verdicts has
recently skyrocketed .... The apparent reason for this errone-
ous impression [of our data] is that a number of highly publi-
cized news articles quoting our statistics have grossly misstated
them. 2 so
Professor Michael Saks concludes that
no serious students of the litigation system regard [JVRI data as
reliable summaries of jury behavior. The JVR data are not the
product of systematic and representative sampling. The resulting
sample of awards is taken disproportionately from the high end of
the distribution, and the resulting summary statistics therefore
overstate the size of awards. In addition, reporting practices may
vary with geography, case type, and over time, such as when pub-
lic controversy over awards rises. As a result, apparent changes
277. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 24.
278. See id.
279. See Torts, Insurance & Compensation Law Section, supra note 72, at 157
chart 8.
280. Product Liability Reform Act of 1986: Hearings on S. 2760 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 226-27 (1986).
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in award patterns may reflect little more than changes in report-
ing patterns and changes in the nature of the sampling bias.281
Post-verdict Reductions:
PPI's discussion of median verdicts in New York takes
place in a vacuum. No consideration is given to the fact that
most large jury verdicts are substantially reduced or even com-
pletely reversed, either by the trial court pursuant to a post-
trial motion, or by the court on appeal. 28 2 The National Law
Journal, in its September 28, 1998, investigative report on large
verdicts rendered in the United States, concluded that "[1]arge
verdicts are frequently no more than an illusion. With rela-
tively rare exceptions, verdicts are cut back, thrown out, settled
for dramatically less that the original amount."28 3 The report
stated that the larger the verdict, the more likely it will be re-
vised.28 4 According to the National Law Journal, out of one
hundred representative jury verdicts nationwide in 1994,
thirty-two were set aside, and thirty-three were reduced, some
by as much as 90%.285 Ten of the remaining cases were brought
against defendants who were ultimately found unable to pay
the judgment.286
These sample findings are consistent with studies showing
a general practice of post-trial reduction of large verdicts. A
study of verdicts of $1,000,000 and above returned in 1984 and
1985 found that 74% of them were reduced and only 43% of the
money originally awarded was actually paid out.287 Similarly, a
General Accounting Office study of product liability cases in five
states from 1983 to 1985 found awards reduced in 50% of the
281. Saks, supra note 155, at 1245. See also Daniels, supra note 13, at 301
(noting that Jury Verdict Research reports are not comprehensive, and tend to
include higher rather than lower verdicts in the compilation, since the higher ones
are more likely to be found by the unscientific methods employed by JVR).
282. See Ivy E. Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury Ver-
dicts and Final Disbursements, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 349 (1986).
283. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Now You See It, Now You Don't! Vanishing Ver-
dicts Are More and More Commonplace, Especially Thanks to the Judges, NAT'L
L.J., Sept, 28, 1998, at C1.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See Broder, supra note 282, at 353.
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cases, 28 and also found that only seventy-six percent of the to-
tal verdict amount was paid. 28 9
In New York, the data showed, approximately 44% of jury awards
were adjusted downward in the immediate period following the
verdict and that the eventual payments to plaintiffs were, on av-
erage, 62% of the awards .... A good number of the cases with
mega-awards are included in the post-trial adjustment calcula-
tions and heavily inflate the statistical mean, but it is likely that
many of these eventually resulted in much lower actual payments
to plaintiffs. 290
Defendants paid an average of 71% of what the jury ordered. 291
As the awards got larger, the post-verdict reductions increased
markedly, both in amount and percentage of the award. 292
PPI's obsession with jury verdicts also ignores what appel-
late judges do when their turn comes. In a study of 3,542 pub-
lished product liability cases that went to appeal, Professors
Henderson and Eisenberg found that in both 1976 and 1983,
defendants were successful on appeal about 51% of the time.293
That rate of success has improved steadily so that by 1988, de-
fendants were winning 63.4% of the time.294 This rate of suc-
cess is markedly higher than the rate of appellate success for all
other claims civil and criminal.
This compelling data concerning post-trial reduction and
reversal demonstrates that PPI's reliance on jury awards is
288. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: VERDICTS
AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES 39 (1989).
289. See id. at 45.
290. Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Ver-
dict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 298 (1999) (citing Brian
Ostrom et al, So the Verdict Is In - What Happens Next?, 16 JusT. SYs. J. 97
(1993)).
291. See Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil
Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 241 n.15 (1996).
292. See MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUS-
TICE REPORT, PosTRiAL ADJusTmENTs To JURY AwARDs viii (1987). See also Vidmar
et al., supra note 290. Based on analysis of verdict reports from California, Florida
and New York, Professor Vidmar concludes that juries are not overcompensating
victims of medical malpractice; rather, they are reaching consistent verdicts,
which are not as high as the press accounts suggest because they are often reduced
by trial judges after the verdict.
293. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolu-
tion in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV.
479, 504 (1990).
294. See id.
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misplaced. Jury awards do not reveal what defendants and in-
surers are actually paying in damages. To the contrary, re-
searchers have concluded that "the system appears to work
already in much the same way that the current proposals for
legal change are intended to work, namely by affecting 'exces-
sive' awards."295
Contrary Research:
Most respected research on tort verdicts indicates that the
number of high awards is either remaining stable or going
down, even without regard to the likelihood of post-verdict re-
duction. Unlike the questionable "research" of Jury Verdict Re-
ports, the New York Jury Verdict Reporter tabulates every jury
verdict in the state. Moreover, as Mark Cooper of Citizen Ac-
tion notes, any "increase in the dollar value of awards over the
past three decades can be attributed to a combination of infla-
tion, and increases in real income, real medical costs and life
expectancy."296 Thus, as people live longer and the price of
health care skyrockets, one could expect some increase in the
amount of a typical personal injury verdict. The fact that there
is no real increase indicates that, in real money terms, jury
awards are in fact going down.
Summarizing a number of respected studies comparing loss
replacement rates for product liability, the economist W. Kip
Viscusi concludes that "the common belief that product liability
awards lead to windfall gains is erroneous. The actual value of
court awards and settlements is... often less than the actual
losses suffered by the victim." 297 In the face of all this contrary
research, it is preposterous for PPI to argue that victim recov-
eries in New York are out of control.
11. Polls
Assertion:
PPI reports that "the people are fed up" with the civil jus-
tice system.298 PPI relies on an "authoritative survey" by Zogby
295. SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 292, at xii.
296. MARK COOPER, CITIZEN ACTION, THE VERDICT IS IN: JURY AWARDS UN-
CHANGED OVER 30 YEARS ii (1995).
297. See Viscusi, supra note 197, at 95-96.
298. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 36.
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International which concludes that "the people overwhelmingly
believe that the cost of lawsuit awards is too high, and that the
current liability system needs major reform."299
Analysis:
It is preposterous to rely on a single poll as the basis for any
kind of tort reform. Clearly, a finding that the public believes
something to be true does not make it true. So even assuming
that the public believes that lawsuits are a way of making "easy
money" as alleged in the Zogby poll, this does not mean that it is
so. As discussed earlier, the empirical evidence indicates that
people with serious injuries are chronically undercompensated,
and that the vast majority of injured victims do not even try to
get recovery from the tort system.300
Stephen Daniels, a researcher for the RAND Corporation,
has this to say about the usefulness of opinion polls in the tort
reform debate:
It is important to re-emphasize that the poll data have nothing to
do with the substance of the matters at issue. They have nothing
to tell about what juries actually do, about plaintiffs and lawyers,
about the amount of litigation, or about the workings of the civil
justice system. The poll data tell only about people's responses to
a set of questions that are designed to elicit their opinions, not
their informed assessments of jury competence and related issues.
Moreover, the wording of the questions can mask a bias that
skews responses in the desired direction. For instance, asking
people which of a list of factors is most responsible for causing the
litigation explosion or the insurance crisis presumes the existence
of those factors, of the explosion, and of the crisis. 301
It would also be preposterous to rely on the Zogby poll in
particular as any indicator of how the public feels about the civil
justice system. To use Daniels' words, that poll was one in
which the wording of the questions masked "a bias that skews
responses in the desired direction."302 Richard Behn, the Presi-
dent of Numbercrunchers, Inc., a respected polling firm, has
written that the Zogby poll relied upon by PPI was one in which
299. Id.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 196-201.
301. Daniels, supra note 13, at 308.
302. Id.
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a "whole series of questions contain anti-tort premises" and that
poll respondents "are naturally inclined to agree with a premise
if only one side of the case is argued."30 3 Behn noted that the
Zogby polling questions were argumentative, and contained no
counter-argument that would have obtained a more balanced
response.304 Specifically, the factual assertions in the questions
were "incendiary." One question, for example, asked respon-
dents their reactions to the statement that "the system is out of
control and clogged by too many lawsuits."30 5 Essentially, citi-
zens were subject to "a set of loaded data."30 6 Given these cir-
cumstances, the Zogby poll could not be considered a reliable
indicator of public views of the civil justice system.30 7
Finally, it should be noted that the poll data on public
views toward the tort system cuts both ways. For example, sev-
eral polls indicate that most people would like to enlarge access
to the justice system rather than restrict it. A 1995
Yankelovich survey found public support for the tort system.308
Thirty-nine percent prefer to retain the present balance be-
tween the injured and insurers. Another 39% favor reform that
would "tilt things a little more in favor of those injured in acci-
dents," and only 7% wish to tilt more the other way.30 9 Three
out of four respondents believed that corporations sometimes
sell dangerous products, and that tort lawsuits help to deter
dangerous corporate activity.310 While these results are subject
to the same kinds of questions surrounding the Zogby poll, the
points to remember are that no one can claim with any cer-
tainty that they know what the public thinks about the tort sys-
tem; and that what the public thinks does not make it so.
303. Letter from Richard J. Behn, President, Numbercrunchers, Inc., to
Joshua M. Pruzansky, President, New York State Bar Association 2 (June 23,
1997) (on file with the New York State Bar Association).
304. See id.
305. Id. at 1.
306. Id. at 2.
307. See id.
308. See YANKELOVICH PARTNERS & TALMEY-DRAKE RESEARCH & STRATEGY,
NATIONAL SURVEY ON TORT REFORM 5-7 (1995).
309. See id. at 4.
310. Id. at 3.
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12. Lawyer Advertising
Assertion:
PPI claims that lawyers, through advertising, are sending a
"subliminal message" to the public that "if something bad hap-
pened to you, a lawyer will help you find someone to blame for
it."311
Analysis:
PPI implies that through advertising, lawyers are drawing
frivolous claims out from a state of dormancy. The allegation is
that if not for advertising, these frivolous claims would remain
dormant and would not be mucking up our system. This claim
is particularly far-fetched given the uncontroverted evidence,
discussed earlier, that most injured victims who are entitled to
recovery do not pursue a legal remedy.312 It is highly probable
that many of these victims do not pursue a remedy because they
do not know how.
This is where advertising comes in. As the Supreme Court
stated in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,313 lawyer advertising
offers great benefits to the public because it helps injured people
to obtain access to justice. 314 The Bates Court specifically re-
jected the assertion now made by PPI, that lawyer advertising
is harmful because it "stirs up litigation."315 The Court an-
swered this argument as follows:
Although advertising might increase the use of the judicial ma-
chinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a
person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal ac-
tion .... Among the reasons for [underclaiming] is fear of the
cost, and an inability to locate a suitable lawyer. Advertising can
help to solve this acknowledged problem. 316
It is ironic that the business community, which bombards
the consumer with all kinds of outrageous advertisements
designed to foist everything from cigarettes to vegamatics on an
unsuspecting public, now complains about lawyer advertising.
Why is advertising appropriate for businesses and not for law-
311. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 37.
312. See supra text accompanying note 300.
313. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
314. See id. at 376-77.
315. Id. at 375-76.
316. Id. at 376.
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yers? Perhaps the argument is that consumers are more easily
victimized by advertising lawyers than by other advertisers.
This argument was refuted by the Court in Bates as well, when
it rejected the underlying assumptions of the argument, i.e.,
that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limita-
tions of lawyer advertising, and that it is better kept in igno-
rance.317 These assumptions, said the Bates Court, rest on "an
underestimation of the public." The Court viewed as "dubious
any justification that is based on the benefits of public
ignorance."318
There is strong evidence that lawyer advertising has sub-
stantial beneficial effects. Richard J. Cebula, a professor of eco-
nomics at the Georgia Institute of Technology, used multiple
regression analysis on existing empirical data and found
(counterintuitively enough) that "lawyer advertising acts to
raise the image of lawyers."319 This is due to lower prices
caused by advertising, and greater access to legal services for
many members of the public.320
The notion that lawyers would use advertising to prey on
an unsuspecting public and encourage frivolous litigation sim-
ply flies in the face of common sense. With so many injured
victims failing to bring a claim, a lawyer does not have to look
for frivolous cases. Moreover, frivolous cases are not cost-effec-
tive, since they are very likely to result not only in no recovery,
but also in the imposition of sanctions on the lawyer. Given the
low success rate for plaintiffs' claims generally in New York, a
lawyer would simply be crazy to stir up frivolous litigation
through costly advertising. Even PPI does not allege that plain-
tiffs' lawyers are crazy.
13. Contingent Fees
Assertion:
PPI asserts that contingent fee arrangements lead to over-
payment of plaintiffs' lawyers. 32' The contingent fee arrange-
317. See id. at 375.
318. Bates, 433 U.S. at 375.
319. Richard J. Cebula, Does Lawyer Advertising Adversely Influence the Im-
age of Lawyers in the United States? An Alternative Perspective and New Empirical
Evidence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 514 (1998).
320. See id.
321. See PUBLIc POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 39.
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ment gives lawyers "a piece of the action", and because of this,
contingent fee lawyers bring frivolous claims in order to cash in
on the "lawsuit lottery."322 This is why contingent fees are out-
lawed in most foreign countries.323
Analysis:
The American legal system is notable for its dearth of legal
aid for lower and middle income citizens, especially for civil
cases.324 Contingent fee arrangements take up the slack. If not
for the contingent fee, injured victims of moderate means would
not be able to undertake the significant expense of obtaining
legal recovery. Unless we want to institute a program of legal
aid for civil cases, the contingent fee is absolutely necessary.
David Vuernick, the Legal Policy Director of Citizens Ac-
tion, notes that any proposal to limit contingent fees is unfair
because, among other things, it imposes a burden on only one
side of a litigation:
Proposals to limit contingency fee agreements are unfair because
they only affect consumers and their attorneys. Limiting contin-
gency fee arrangements without limiting the amount of money
that corporations can spend on their defense is one-sided. Busi-
nesses will still be able to hire the best legal defense that their
money can but, if limits are placed on contingency fee agreements,
consumers may be limited in their choice of counsel. Proposals
which limit contingency fees affect only one set of players in the
civil justice system - consumers. Businesses sued by consumers
would not be affected nor would businesses which sue other busi-
nesses be affected because they rarely rely on contingency fee
agreements. 325
Professor Angela Wennihan, reporting on a study of contin-
gent fees, confirms Vuernick's assessment about the critical so-
cietal importance of contingent fees.3 26 She states that the
contingent fee "has proven particularly well-suited to the situa-
322. Id.
323. See id. at 41.
324. See id. at 39. See also Richard Vuernick, Congressional Testimony
before Senate Judiciary Committee on Contingency Fee Agreements (Nov. 7,
1995).
325. Vuernick Testimony, supra note 324.
326. See Angela Wennihan, Let's Put the Contingency Back in the Contingency
Fee, 49 SMU L. REV. 1639, 1648 (1996).
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tion where an individual has been injured and desires to sue on
the basis of the injury, but is unable to afford representation
precisely because of the injury." 27 She also observes that the
contingent fee "has produced safer products by giving the
poorest of clients the ability to haul even the largest of compa-
nies into court for producing a defective product."3 2 The busi-
ness community's attack on contingent fees is quite ironic, given
its general belief in the virtues of the free market. These free
marketeers apparently have no trouble proposing substantial
market limitations on the contract between injured victims and
their counsel.3 29
The argument that contingent fees encourage frivolous liti-
gation is illogical. In a contingent fee arrangement, a lawyer
who takes a case must pay the costs of the litigation up front,
for the chance of a percentage return of an ultimate recovery. It
simply makes no economic sense for a contingent fee lawyer to
bring frivolous litigation because there is only cost and no bene-
fit. As Philip Corboy has stated: "Lawyers who employ the con-
tingent fee mechanism are .. .the members of the profession
whose practice is least protected from the forces of the market-
place and who therefore cannot afford to spend great amounts of
time on cases which hold out no honest promise of success."330
This logic has been recognized by the courts.33 '
Besides logic, the evidence shows that contingent fee law-
yers provide an important function in screening out cases of du-
bious merit. A 1973 study by the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare found that a large percentage of tort
cases brought to attorneys was rejected by them and not filed.3 3 2
The Civil Litigation Research Project found that only half the
327. Id. at 1646.
328. Id. at 1648.
329. The same point is made by Professor Charles Silver of the University of
Texas School of Law. See Silver, Control Fees? No, Let the Market Do Its Job, NAT'L
L.J., April 18, 1994, at A17.
330. Philip Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse
Door, LITIG., Summer 1976, at 27, 32.
331. See, e.g., Balts v. Balts, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (Minn. 1966) (noting that law-
yers are not likely to encourage meritless litigation, "particularly where the cus-
tomary fee arrangement is a contingent one").
332. See LEON POCINCKI, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
FARE, The Incidence of Iatrogenic Injuries, in APPENDIX: REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 50, 50 (1973).
392 [Vol. 20:339
54http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/6
'AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM'
injury complaints brought to a lawyer became filed cases.333
Clearly, tort lawyers are filtering out cases of questionable
merit.
Perhaps the argument against contingent fees is not that
they encourage frivolous litigation, but rather that they en-
courage meritorious litigation that would not otherwise be
brought. This is similar to the attack on advertising, discussed
supra, that it brings claims out of the woodwork that would
otherwise have lain dormant. If that is the argument, it falls of
its own weight. Litigation is not an evil. Underclaiming by in-
nocent victims is an evil. To the extent that the contingent fee
reduces the deplorable rate of underclaiming in this country, it
is an unmitigated good.
Much has been made, in the PPI report and elsewhere,
about the fact that contingent fee arrangements are not widely
employed outside the United States.33 4 One reason for this,
however, is that many countries have a legal aid system that
permits disadvantaged victims to obtain free legal aid to vindi-
cate their legal rights. The leading example of such an alterna-
tive system is England.335 However, it is extremely unlikely
that the United States would undertake the costs of socialized
lawyering in exchange for the current contingent fee system.
Likewise, as was recently recognized by the Canadian province
of Ontario when it recently established a contingent fee system
for tort cases, the alternative of simply leaving injured victims
to pay for their own litigation costs up front is too harsh to even
contemplate. The primary motivation was "a need to provide
indigent clients access to the legal system."336 The fact that
some countries leave innocent, penurious victims to their own
devices is no reason to emulate them.
It is notable that the exorbitant cost of the civil legal aid
system has led the British government to propose switching to
an American-style contingent fee system for civil cases.33 7 The
Association of British Insurers and the Association of Insurance
333. See DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL
REPORT S-18 to S-20 (1983).
334. See Wennihan, supra note 326, at 1644.
335. See id.
336. See Wennihan, supra note 326, at 1645.
337. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 27.
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and Risk Managers have endorsed the proposal.338 Their rea-
soning is that the legal aid system did little to discourage the
assertion of unmeritorious claims.3 39 A plaintiffs lawyer being
paid by legal aid was found to have little incentive to screen out
dubious cases.340 In contrast, the contingent fee system guaran-
tees that plaintiffs' lawyers will refuse to bring cases that have
little chance of recovery. 341 Arguing in favor of the proposal, the
Executive Director of British Risk Managers states that contin-
gent fees will make lawyers take cases "on their merits" and
will reduce the number of claims being brought against busi-
nesses. 342 This assessment by a member of the insurance indus-
try underscores the need for retaining the contingent fee as the
most cost-effective means of access to justice for consumers, and
as the best means of screening out frivolous litigation.343
14. Too Many Lawyers
Assertion:
PPI argues that there are too many lawyers in New York,
that the number of lawyers is increasing dramatically, and that
the surplus of lawyers inevitably leads to more tort litigation.344
PPI cites statistics indicating that New York has fifty-eight law-
yers per 100,000 citizens, a higher ratio than any state except
Massachusetts and New Jersey.3 45 PPI also states that most of
the lawyers in New York State practice in New York City,
"which also produces an exceptionally high rate of tort litigation
and large jury verdicts."346
Analysis:
The most glaring flaw in PPI's argument is that it relies on
a global statistic, the number of lawyers as a class. No attempt
is made to break out the figures for the targets of PPI's ire, law-
yers who bring tort claims for injured plaintiffs. There is every
338. See id.
339. See id.
340. See generally id.
341. See id.
342. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 27.
343. See id. at 28.
344. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 44-45.
345. See id. at 44.
346. Id.
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reason to think that the increase in lawyers in New York has
gone mostly, if not completely, to other practice areas. As dis-
cussed earlier, the rate of jury verdicts in plaintiffs' tort litiga-
tion has remained steady in the last ten years.347 What has
gone up is the rate of litigation between businesses.348 More-
over, the booming financial markets have created an undeniable
demand for corporate lawyers in recent years, as has the recent
real estate boom. Finally, it is common knowledge that much of
the increase in the lawyer population has gone into the major
law firms. These firms, with hundreds of actively practicing
lawyers, do not generally handle plaintiff personal injury work.
The common sense notion that any increase in lawyers is
going to other areas of practice is supported by one of the few
studies in this area. Professors Michael Trebilcock, Donald De-
wees and David Duff conducted extensive empirical research of
malpractice litigation trends in Canada and the United
States. 349 They concluded that there was " no support for the
hypothesis that the growing number of practicing lawyers per
capita has increased malpractice claims."350
Dean Robert C. Clark of Harvard Law School, in his article,
Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?,351 provides a
number of cogent explanations for the growth in lawyers and
none of them are related to any tort litigation crisis. Among
other things, he states that "the work of lawyers concerned with
international trade and finance has increased enormously; it is
one of the fastest areas of growth in the market for legal serv-
ices. Similarly, movements of people across borders have made
immigration law one of the fastest growing areas of law prac-
tice."352 He also concludes that increased diversity in our society
has created a greater need for lawyers in such areas as employ-
ment, housing, and family relations. 353 Furthermore, the rise in
wealth levels in our society has led to an increased demand for
lawyers. When essentials like food and housing are taken care
347. See supra text accompanying note 259.
348. See DOROSHOW, supra note 12, at 26.
349. See Trebilcock et al., supra note 121, at 205.
350. Id. at 218.
351. 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 275 (1992).
352. Id. at 292.
353. See id. at 291.
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of, people "move on to previously neglected desires" such as an
interest in the environment.35 4
Dean Clark completely rejects the notion that there has
been a marked increase in plaintiffs' tort lawyers. He concludes
as follows:
Although the "litigation explosion" is popularly blamed on greedy
tort plaintiffs and their avaricious lawyers, in fact there has been
a disproportionate increase in recent years . . . in the extent to
which litigation in federal courts is comprised of businesses suing
one another in disputes arising out of their contractual dealings,
intellectual property claims, and similar matters. 355
In light of all this evidence, it is clear that PPI's attack on
tort plaintiffs' lawyers is completely without basis.
Part II. Critique of PPI's Proposed Reforms
Part I of this Essay has shown that there is no factual basis
for limiting the recovery of tort plaintiffs. This section critiques
some of the major proposals for "tort reform" advocated by PPI
in its report, "An Accident and a Dream."356
Some of PPI's proposals are dependent on factual bases or
policy assumptions that have already been debunked in Part I.
Those specific proposals will not be discussed here. They in-
clude: 1) "chang[ing] the compensation system for plaintiffs'
lawyers"357 (unnecessary to discuss because it has already been
shown that the contingent fee provides access to justice and
helps to guarantee that lawyers will not bring questionable
suits); 2) "reform[ing] liability standards governing voluntary
organizations" 358 (unnecessary to discuss because these protec-
tions are already provided under federal law); 3) "eliminat[ing]
absolute liability for contractors who provide safe work-
places" 359 (unnecessary to discuss because contractors have no
liability if the workplace is safe, and the courts have essentially
employed a negligence standard); 4) "allow[ing] employers to
354. Id.
355. Id. at 297.
356. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 46-48.
357. Id. at 47.
358. Id.
359. Id.
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provide honest job references" 360 (unnecessary to discuss be-
cause employers are already protected by the law when they
give honest job references); and 5) preventing "criminals from
recovering for injuries they suffer in the course of committing a
felony"361 (unnecessary to discuss because the case on which
this suggestion is based was one in which the officer violated
the individual's federal constitutional rights by shooting him in
the back even though he was fleeing and unarmed; those rights
cannot be changed by legislation).
With these unjustified "reforms" out of the way, this Essay
proceeds to address the major "priorities for change" set forth in
"An Accident and a Dream."
1. Repeal of the Joint and Several Liability Doctrine
PPI argues that the doctrine of joint and several liability is
unfair because it requires a defendant to pay the entire amount
of damages, "even if that defendant's contribution to the prob-
lem was minor."362 PPI advocates a repeal of the doctrine. 363
The problem with repealing the doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability is that an injured plaintiff will have to assume the
risk that all of the wrongdoing defendants will be able to pay
their share of the plaintiffs full recovery. In many cases, the
plaintiff will not be able to obtain recovery from all the wrong-
doers; some may have gone out of business while others may
have filed for bankruptcy. The question is, who should assume
the risk of loss when one of the wrongdoers cannot be held fi-
nancially accountable, the innocent victim or the other wrong-
doers? Simply stating the question indicates the fairness of the
joint and several liability rule. It makes far more sense to make
the wrongdoers pay, since by definition their wrongful conduct
has injured the plaintiff.
Yet despite the inherent fairness of the rule, the New York
Legislature already has seen fit to impose substantial limita-
tions on joint and several liability in personal injury cases.
Under CPLR 1601, a tortfeasor who is less that 50% at fault
360. Id.
361. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 46-48.
362. Id. at 46.
363. See id.
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cannot be held liable for a disproportionate amount of the plain-
tiffs non-economic injury.36
PPI wants to go further and totally repeal the doctrine of
joint and several liability. All this will do is further shift the
cost of injury from wrongdoing defendants to either innocent
victims, or to society by way of public compensation. It is diffi-
cult to see what is gained from such a harsh result.
Perhaps it could be argued that the harshness of the repeal
of joint and several liability would be counterbalanced by the
societal benefit (if it can be called that) of less litigation. The
research in states that have rejected joint and several liability
shows that such benefits are questionable at best.365 Professors
Han-Duck Lee, Mark J. Browne, and Joan T. Schmit have con-
ducted empirical research on litigation trends in those states
that have repealed joint and several liability.366 They noted an
increase in tort litigation in these states, which they attribute in
part to the fact that repeal of joint and several liability "reduces
incentives for defendant safety"367 because it exposes wrongdo-
ers to a lesser risk of payment.368 Another reason for the in-
crease in litigation is that plaintiffs are "forced to bring
separate legal actions against each tortfeasor in order to collect
the value of all harms."369 The Professors state that a repeal of
joint and several liability "forces the plaintiff to sue everybody
that might conceivably be at fault, which means that insurers
end up defending policy holders in more cases. . . ."37 Finally,
364. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 1996).
365. See Han-Duck Lee et al., How Does Joint and Several Tort Reform Affect
the Rate of Tort Filings?: Evidence from the State Courts, 61 J. RISK & INS. 295
(1994).
366. See id.
367. Id. at 300.
368. See also Komesar, supra note 19, at 68-69 (1990) (repeal ofjoint and sev-
eral liability would increase the number of injuries, because it is the "deep pocket"
tortfeasors who are most sensitive to the incentives of the tort system; joint and
several liability serves "the purpose of focusing civil liability on those potential
avoiders of injury who are most likely to respond to the civil liability signal").
369. Han-Duck Lee et al., supra note 365, at 300.
370. Id. (quoting Joanne Wojcik, Florida Rulings Cap Liability, Bus. INs.,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 43-44 (quoting statement of Barbara W. Green, spokesperson for
the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers regarding a Florida court's upholding Flor-
ida's joint and several liability reform)).
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the Professors discovered a very sizeable jump in the number of
filings in the year before the effective date of the reform.371
For all these reasons, any further "reform" of the joint and
several liability rule is unjustified and is likely to be
counterproductive.
2. Cap on Non-economic Damages
PPI wants to put a cap of an unspecified amount on awards
for non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering.372 PPI
asserts that awards for non-economic damages "are concen-
trated in a relatively small number of cases in which a jury has
decided to make an extravagant gesture."373
The injustice of a cap on non-economic damages is well-
stated by Professor Neal Komesar:
The importance of these nonpecuniary losses can be seen by ask-
ing yourself whether you would be indifferent or even nearly in-
different between an uninjured state and a severely injured state,
such as paraplegia, blindness, or severe brain damage, so long as
your income and wealth remained constant .... Income and
wealth are only in service of those myriad activities that make up
life and living. These activities are the primary elements of life;
pecuniary elements are secondary. It turns reality on its head to
give transcendence to the pecuniary. 374
Professor Komesar also notes that non-economic damage
awards are necessary to deter corporations from engaging in
unsafe practices:
Any determination of the desirable level of prevention that ig-
nored nonpecuniary losses would grossly underestimate the de-
sire for prevention. When the torts system attempts to induce the
correct level of prevention, a signal sent to potential injurers that
reflected only the pecuniary aspects of loss would induce far too
little prevention .... To the extent that prevention is desirable
and, more importantly, obtainable, reforms that cap or limit pecu-
niary loss are counter-productive. 375
371. See id. at 306.
372. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 46-47.
373. Id. at 47.
374. Komesar, supra note 19, at 58.
375. Id. at 59.
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Virtually all scholars in economics and law agree that awards of
non-economic damages are absolutely necessary to deter corpo-
rate misconduct and to protect innocent citizens.37 6 This propo-
sition simply makes economic sense.
Part of PPI's complaint against non-economic damage
awards is that they are haphazard, in that that they are used
only when a particular jury "decided to make an extravagant
gesture. ''377
Systematic studies of jury damage awards indicate that, on aver-
age, awards are rather modest. Comparisons of compensatory
awards against assessments of seriousness of injuries and eco-
nomic losses indicate that awards tend to be consistent with ac-
tual losses. Some findings indicate that variability in awards may
be as likely due to variability in trial evidence as to jury unrelia-
bility. Comparisons of jurors and judges with respect to assess-
ments of damages for "pain and suffering" show that their
respective decisionmaking processes are similar. Punitive dam-
ages are awarded with much less frequency and the awards are,
on average, much more modest than is commonly portrayed in the
mass media. Some juries do produce outlier awards that cannot
easily be justified by legal criteria, but studies of post-verdict ad-
justment processes, such as judicial reductions and settlements
between the parties, tend to very substantially alter the awards
downward, particularly the larger awards. In fact, one of the most
important lessons from this review is that a main focus of re-
searchers and policy makers should be on what is ultimately paid
to plaintiffs rather than jury awards. The jury system is embed-
376. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alter-
native Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 51
(1991) ("From a deterrence standpoint, the inclusion of nonpecuniary losses is de-
sirable because it optimizes both care levels and activity levels."); Randall
Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering, 83
Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 934 (1989) ("[Ilt makes theoretical and practical sense to as-
sess liability for more than economic loss, so that careless behavior is sufficiently
deterred. To consider only economic loss places at particular risk persons with
little or no earnings, such as homemakers, children, and retirees."); Stanley
Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772,
799 (1985) ("Unless the full costs of physical and emotional distress are properly
internalized through tort law, the price of the activities that generated such inju-
ries will insufficiently reflect their actual costs. In effect, victims of the public
would subsidize the cost of high-risk activities, thereby leading to inadequate
deterrence.").
377. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 47.
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ded in a larger system that has corrective mechanisms for way-
ward jury verdicts.378
The case simply has not been made that the benefit of a cap
on non-economic damages (other than adding to the profit mar-
gins of insurance companies) outweighs the diminished deter-
rence, greater safety risks, and substantial injustice that such a
cap will impose on consumers. Moreover, any attempt to im-
pose a cap on legitimate damages should be approached with
caution because it is fraught with constitutional problems. Sev-
eral courts have invalidated damage caps as violating an in-
jured victim's constitutional rights. For example, in Smith v.
Department of Insurance,379 the court held that a damage cap
limit of $450,000 for non-economic damages violated the vic-
tim's constitutional right of access to the courts. 380 Addition-
ally, in Boyd v. Bulala,38 l a statute capping total amount of
damages in malpractice cases at $1 million was held to violate
the plaintiffs constitutional right to a jury trial.38 2
3. Barring the Use of Post-manufacture Improvements as
Evidence
PPI states that New York law permits a plaintiff to intro-
duce remedial measures taken by the defendant after an injury
to prove that the product injuring the plaintiff was defective. 383
According to PPI, this rule of evidence deters manufacturers
from making repairs or other innovations, for fear that these
measures will be used against them at a trial. 38 4
378. Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 849, 898 (1998).
379. 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
380. See id. at 1087-89. Interestingly, insurance companies also brought a
constitutional attack on the tort reform package passed by the Florida legislature.
The Florida legislature, in exchange for imposing substantial limitations on the
rights of injured victims, imposed stricter regulations on insurance companies.
The insurance companies were happy with the tort reforms, but attacked these
new insurance regulations in Smith, arguing that they violated the rights of the
insurance companies to due process and equal protection. The Florida Supreme
Court in Smith rejected the insurance industry claims.
381. 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987).
382. See id. See also Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997)
(striking cap on non-economic damages).
383. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 47.
384. See id. at 11.
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Whatever the merits of PPI's deterrence-based argument,
PPI has seriously overstated the law on admissibility of subse-
quent remedial measures in New York. That law is described
as follows in a treatise on New York evidence:
As applied to strict liability cases, the rule regarding evidence of
subsequent changes depends on the legal theory asserted. When
the theory is a design defect or a warning defect, liability may not
be shown by subsequent changes in the design or warnings, re-
spectively. 385 Even though denominated "strict liability," those
causes of action are based on a balancing of risk and utility fac-
tors, involving considerations of reasonable care, just as in
negligence. 386
In manufacturing defect cases (e.g., a sharp object packed
in a can of tuna), the New York Court of Appeals has held that
subsequent remedial measures are admissible to show the
existence of a defect. 38 7 However, as discussed earlier, manu-
facturing defect claims make up only a small minority of prod-
uct liability claims.388 Thus, in the vast majority of product
liability claims, subsequent remedial measures are inadmissi-
ble to prove a defect in a product.38 9
While PPI has completely overstated the problem it ad-
dresses, there is something to be said for excluding subsequent
remedial measures when offered to prove a manufacturing de-
fect in a specific product. It is not that exclusion is necessary to
encourage remedial measures, since a business has substantial
economic reasons, independent of any litigation, for making
products safer for the future. Rather, exclusion of the subse-
quent remedial measure is warranted because
[cihanges in the design are in no sense probative on whether a
mishap in the manufacturing process caused a particular product
to be defective.... Thus, when the only defect asserted is in man-
ufacture or assembly (i.e., it is the particular item, not the whole
line of similar items, that does not meet reasonable consumer ex-
pectations) evidence of subsequent remedial measures should be
385. Citing Cover v. Cohen, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984).
386. MICHAEL MARTIN ET AL., NEW YORK EVIDENCE 274-75 (Aspen 1997).
387. Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 551 (N.Y. 1981).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
389. See Caprara, 417 N.E.2d at 549-51.
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excluded because it is not relevant rather than because of any ex-
clusionary rule based on balancing or policy.390
In sum, PPI has a valid argument that subsequent reme-
dial measures should not be admissible to prove a defect in
product liability cases. However it is an argument that has al-
ready been accepted and applied in the vast majority of these
cases.
4. Protect Retailers from Liability for Products They Sell
PPI claims that it is unjust for a retailer to be subject to a
defective product claim when the defect was caused by the man-
ufacturer and the retailer had no reason to know that the prod-
uct was dangerous. 391 PPI argues that the law should be
changed to provide that a retailer could not be sued in these
circumstances.3 92
The problem is that such a "reform" would be of little use.
The Committee on Product Liability of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, a Committee made up of both
plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, has stated that granting im-
munity to retailers would have only "limited practical effect."393
The reason is that in real-life litigation, "the seller has an in-
demnification claim against the manufacturer for any amounts
the ultimate purchaser may recover from the seller. Thus, in
the typical case the seller may be named as a defendant but it is
the manufacturer that assumes the real burden of defense."394
Sellers, therefore, do not need the protection that PPI
would give them. In fact, the only situation in which seller-im-
munity would have a practical effect would be where the manu-
facturer for some reason, such as bankruptcy, could not be a
source of recovery. In that situation, the question is, who
should assume the risk of loss from a dangerous and defective
product, the seller, who has profited from sale of the defective
product, or the innocent victim? Current law says that the seller
carries the risk of loss in this unusual situation. A law provid-
390. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 386, at 276.
391. See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 47.
392. See id.
393. Report on the Proposed Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, 53 REC.
AsS'N B. CITY N.Y. 532, 543 (1998).
394. Id.
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ing that a seller would never be liable, even if the manufacturer
cannot pay for the victim's injuries, clearly is unduly harsh and
its benefits to society are nil, because such a rule would ordina-
rily result in the transfer of the costs of a victim's injuries from
the seller to the social welfare system.
5. A Renewed Focus on Contracts
PPI states that contractual relationships "should be given a
chance to work ... in the area of liability."395 PPI cites as an
example an "Auto-Choice" plan, which would allow consumers
to purchase a "'personal protection insurance' policy" in ex-
change for which consumers would waive their chance to win
pain and suffering damages.396 They would also be protected
from pain and suffering claims by other consumers. 397 In ex-
change for opting out, consumers would allegedly save money in
premiums. 398
It is clear, however, that a shift from a tort system to a con-
tract system would be far more complex and problematic than
PPI implies. As Professor Mark Hager states in attacking the
contract-based proposals of Peter Huber: "It is tedious to feel
compelled at this late date to reemphasize gaping fallacies in
classical contractual paradigms. Reemphasis is needed, how-
ever, because Huber and others of a right-wing persuasion seem
determined to revive classical contract arguments in all their
fascinating obtuseness."399
The vision of tort reform by contract is one in which con-
sumers somehow enter into individualized contractual agree-
ments with corporations. The idea is that a consumer can
individualize his safety practices and protections by agreeing in
advance to waive certain tort rights that he does not think he
needs, in exchange for lower prices for products. The con-
sumer's safety is tied into the flexibility that the contract sup-
posedly allows.
This utopian vision of free-market contracting of safety
questions, between parties of substantially equal bargaining
395. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 48.
396. Id.
397. See id.
398. See id.
399. Hager, supra note 18, at 545.
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power, is sheer fantasy. The fantasy starts with the picture of
contract as a regime of infinite flexibility and individuality. In
this dream, consumers and corporations, in every transaction
involving risk, haggle in minute detail over the contractual allo-
cation and cost of those risks. In the real world, of course, this
will not happen. What is far more likely in a contract system is
a prevalence of standard forms, unequal bargaining power, boil-
erplate waivers, and incomplete information for overmatched
consumers. Moreover, the very idea of individualized flexibility
in contracting safety risks is unworkable; the consumer would
have a full-time job going over contracts for everything from
cars to lawnmowers to tuna fish cans. There would also be an
abundance of jobs for the hated lawyers, maybe even those
plaintiffs' lawyers who would lose their jobs if the tort system
were dismantled.
The undoubted result of a contract system is that corpora-
tions, the repeat players, will utilize expertise, bargaining
power advantages, and standardized clauses to secure contrac-
tually lowered safety and compensation levels. This will cer-
tainly further PPI's hope of reducing expenditures, but it would
not provide society with contractually improved safety.
The only example of a contract-based system specifically
mentioned by PPI is the "Auto-Choice" plan, under which a mo-
torist could agree in advance to waive tort claims in exchange
for assertedly lower insurance premiums. 40 0 But this is hardly
a good example of a contract system. In fact it shows that "con-
tract" systems end up limiting the choices of individual victims,
without any corresponding benefit. Choice plans do not allow
individuals who opt for traditional coverage to sue in court, if
the person who injures them has opted for the no-fault "choice."-
Robert Hunter, an insurance actuary who has served as Federal
Insurance Administrator, has stated that the "choice" plan is
not based on a free-market contracting system at all:
The claim of "choice" is a fraud .... Choice plans do not allow
suits as we know them except in the case of a fault driver hitting a
fault driver. Choice rhetoric does not reveal this so people are
confused. Choice no-fault has not gained consumer support in the
many years it has been pushed and defeated at the state level ....
400. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 48.
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Choice is designed to minimize consumer benefits. It is not a fair
trade-off for giving up your right to sue.401
Even if a choice system for automobile accidents was work-
able, the notion of extending such no-fault principles to other
aspects of tort liability is extremely problematic. For example,
in product liability cases, a no-fault system would be a disaster
because it would not provide sufficient deterrence against un-
safe products. This conclusion was reached by Professor Neal
Komesar in an important study of the viability of no-fault
systems:
The configuration of impact is quite different for the products lia-
bility setting than it is for the automobile setting. In the case of
products liability, the prospect of deterrence through tort liability
is much higher. The high per capita stakes for potential products-
accident injurers make them more responsive to the incentives to
prevent accidents. These high stakes also provide greater incen-
tive for experience rating and self-insurance, which reduce the
problems caused by liability insurance. 40 2
The problem with a no-fault system for product liability, ac-
cording to Professor Komesar, is that damage schedules will be
set politically, by looking at a class of potential injurers and vic-
tims, rather than at real-life people in a jury trial.40 3 Thus, in a
contest for influence between potential victims and injurers in
setting the schedules, "the position of the high-stakes potential
injurers is likely to be significantly overrepresented, and those
schedules or caps will be biased downward .... -404 This will
accordingly result in diminished deterrence of unsafe practices.
Similarly, Patricia Danzon, a researcher for the RAND Cor-
poration, has concluded that a no-fault system will not work in
medical malpractice cases.40 5 Danzon states that a no-fault sys-
tem for medical injury would have "serious disadvantages,"
most importantly because litigation will still be necessary. 40 6
She explains as follows:
401. See Statement of J. Robert Hunter to the Joint Economic Committee,
Mar. 19, 1997.
402. Komesar, supra note 19, at 53.
403. See id. at 54.
404. Id.
405. See Danzon, supra note 118, at 200-03.
406. Id. at 200.
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First, it would be necessary to show that the injury arose "out of
or in the course of medical care," as opposed to being the unavoid-
able outcome of the underlying condition for which the treatment
was sought. Litigating over cause could be as costly as litigating
over fault, since it would presumably be necessary to show some
"defect" in treatment. The costs of distinguishing medical injuries
from adverse outcomes due to bad luck would almost certainly be
higher than the costs of determining work relatedness for work-
ers' compensation claims. Second, if this compensation were fi-
nanced through liability insurance purchased by individual
physicians, premium payments would consume a much larger
fraction of physicians' income than under the present system.
Premium fluctuations would therefore introduce greater variabil-
ity into physicians' net incomes. 407
Professor Danzon also observes that the no-fault system for
medical injuries that is used in New Zealand has not worked
out.408 She notes studies in New Zealand indicating "that the
elimination of liability has led to laxer standards of medical
care."40 9 Because the recovery under a no-fault plan is much less
than the actual injuries suffered, Danzon concludes that "any
no-fault scheme for medical injuries tends to evolve into a sys-
tem of national health and disability insurance."410 Thus, "the
extreme alternative of a no-fault compensation plan, financed
either by premiums paid by medical providers or by general
taxes, would probably cost even more than the present system
relative to benefits."41 '
407. Id. at 200-01.
408. See id. at 202-03.
409. Id. at 203. For a further critique of the New Zealand system, see Bryce
Wilkinson, New Zealand's Failed Experiment with State Monopoly Accident Insur-
ance, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 45 (1998). Wilkinson prepared his report for the New Zea-
land Business Roundtable and came to the following conclusions: 1) the system is
now bankrupt since the costs have vastly exceeded payments into the fund; 2) the
.consensus" from all parts of society is that "the system has failed to meet expecta-
tions," id. at 50, and "has been a source of endless controversy and dissension," id.
at 50-51; and 3) the workplace fatality rate has risen 15% since the system has
been in place, whereas the rate for other countries has gone down. See id. at 53.
Wilkinson concludes that "[a]s other nations consider proposals to enact their own
varieties of tort and liability insurance reform, New Zealand's attempt should be a
cautionary tale." Id. at 46.
410. Danzon, supra note 118, at 203.
411. Id. at 204. It is also notable that Indiana, as part of its tort reform, insti-
tuted a professionally administered patient compensation fund to decide all losses
above $100,000. Contrary to expectations, malpractice awards in Indiana came to
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Of course, PPI is not really concerned about "benefits." The
only animating concern is limiting costs. This is why PPI can
argue on the one hand that tort defendants should not be held
liable unless the plaintiff proves fault, and on the other hand
that the tort system should be replaced by a no-fault system.
The arguments appear contradictory when, in fact, both propos-
als lead to a reduction of rights of recovery for innocent victims,
and a corresponding increase in net profits for businesses. Yet,
as Danzon demonstrated, whatever costs businesses save by re-
ducing their payments to tort victims will simply be spread to
the taxpayer by way of social insurance. 412 In sum, tort reform
is simply not worth it.
Conclusion
PPI's case for tort reform is not based on fact. It is simply
another part of the onslaught on public opinion, generated by
tort reformers, to create a mindset that the tort system is out of
control. The attack looks at the costs of the tort system, but not
its benefits. It is a carefully crafted attack, ostensibly looking at
what is good for society, but on close analysis focusing only on
corporate financial benefits to business. The attack of tort re-
formers favors cost savings over quality and emphasizes the
corporate bottom line over safety.
Any arguable savings to business caused by the tort re-
forms proposed by PPI will not benefit society in the long run.
Such changes would simply shift the cost of the current system
to other places, such as a system of social insurance, without
giving nearly the same benefits to victims that the current sys-
tem provides. Moreover, a fair analysis of all of the evidence
indicates that any perceived benefits to business from its tort
reform initiatives will be largely, if not totally, illusory.
average one-third higher than its neighboring states, which retained traditional
malpractice systems. See Galanter, Real World Torts, supra note 106. Why? The
probability is that professional administrators are better able than juries to calcu-
late damages, and therefore come closer to the correct (and higher) amount of an
individual victim's injuries. This conclusion is consistent with the studies, dis-
cussed in Part I which show that juries routinely undercompensate the more seri-
ous claims for damage.
412. See Danzon, supra note 118, at 197-98.
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